Essays on Firms and Human Behavior by Aguelakakis, Nicolas
Washington University in St. Louis
Washington University Open Scholarship
Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations Arts & Sciences
Spring 5-15-2017
Essays on Firms and Human Behavior
Nicolas Aguelakakis
Washington University in St. Louis
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds
Part of the Economics Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Arts & Sciences at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For
more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aguelakakis, Nicolas, "Essays on Firms and Human Behavior" (2017). Arts & Sciences Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 1084.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/art_sci_etds/1084
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS
Department of Economics
Dissertation Examination Committee:
Brian W. Rogers, Chair
Joseph Cullen
John Nachbar
Paulo Natenzon
Bruce Petersen
Essays on Firms and Human Behavior
by
Nicolas Aguelakakis
A dissertation presented to
The Graduate School
of Washington University in
partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy
May 2017
St. Louis, Missouri
c© 2017, Nicolas Aguelakakis
Table of Contents
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . x
1 Collaborate or Consolidate: Assessing the Competitive Effects of Production Joint
Ventures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Baseline model and equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Downstream competition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Setting the input price . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Why firms might still prefer to merge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Hypermarts and Gas Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2.1 Commeth the Hypermart . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.2.2 Example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2.3 Example 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.3 Industry Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.4 Tucson Market . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.2 Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Economic Significance of Hypermart Entry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3 On the Role of Matching and Social Norms in Epidemics Dynamics . . . . . . . . 73
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.2.1 Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
ii
3.2.2 General Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
3.2.3 Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2.4 Dynamics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.3 Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.3.1 Reducing the cost of opportunity of N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.3.2 Heterogeneous signal on prevalence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
3.3.3 Weakening the norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
3.5 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
iii
List of Figures
1.1 Value of t Such That Firms 1 and 2 are Indifferent Between JV and Merger . 34
1.2 Relative Profits under asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.3 Effect in prices of collaborators asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4 Effects in competitor's and input prices under asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5 Relative Profits under asymmetry and total control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.1 Distribution in example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.2 Effects of hypermart in Example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.3 Effects of hypermart in Example 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2.4 Example 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.5 Effects of hypermart in Example 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.6 Effects of hypermart in Example 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.7 Evolution of market share of hypermarts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.1 Early deviations by strength of the norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.2 Early deviations for low λ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
3.3 Replicator G . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.4 Policies under no norm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.5 Effect of policy I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.6 Effect of policy II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
3.7 Timing for short policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
iv
List of Tables
1.1 Bertrand Equilibrium: Joint Venture vs. Horizontal Merger . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.2 Cournot Equilibrium: Joint Venture vs. Horizontal Merger . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.1 US Gasoline Retailers Declining, Hypermarts Increasing . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.2 Hypermarts by Store Type: 2006 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
2.3 Mean Price of Regular Gasoline: Tucson, AZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.4 Mean Price of Regular Gasoline by Brand: Tucson, AZ . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.5 Summary Statistics of Control Variables: Tucson, AZ (235 Obs.) . . . . . . . 64
2.6 Regression of Regular Price of Gasoline: Tucson, AZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
v
Acknowledgments
These works would never have been possible to be written without the help and guidance of
many bright minds I am happy to have crossed paths with. First and foremost, Aleksandr
Yankelevich. Not only he is the coauthor of the first chapter, but he's also been a good
friend and mentor. I don't know if I would have ever been able to graduate if it wasn't for
his proactive phone calls, advice and lending of his ears, despite his already crazy daily work
schedule. A true mensch.
When in 2010, I told the news to one of my reference letter writers that I was accepted
to Washington University, he mentioned that not only it was a good program but also that
he knew John Nachbar, and "he is a very good person". He was certainly right, and this
applies not only to the rest of the committee members but other faculty in the department.
John has been important in my formation as an economist. In the three years I've been part
of his reading group, not only I had the practice on how to present academic work, but I
also learn from him what makes a paper a good one, which can be invisible to the eyes of
the unexperienced.
I would like to thank to the rest of the committee members for their patience and advice.
Probably in every single visit to Brian Rogers' office my thoughts went from feeling that I
should do a U-turn and ride downhill, to finding out that the climb ahead is not as steep
as it looked from the bottom. I am also indebted Paulo Natenzon and Bruce Petersen for
helping me see the road ahead, not only the possible alternatives, but also not afraid to tell
vi
me which ones I shouldn't pursue. I am thankful to Joseph Cullen for inviting me to be part
of the project that became my second chapter in this manuscript. His knowledge of how
industries actually behave are made me curious to explore more applied topics in Industrial
Organization. I would repeat the words of my Masters' degree letter writer for any of them.
I regret not interacting more with them. I try to accomplish work on my own, and a mix
of perfectionism and personal insecurity prevented me to do so. I realized too late that this
was harmful to the quality of the work of an aspiring scholar.
I am also grateful to other faculty that I am glad I shared classrooms and seminars with,
specially Werner Ploberger, for letting me stay for a seventh year in the program, Murray
Weidenbaum, for, in a very short time, sparked in me how the relation between government
and business works and Rody Manuelli (in and outside the soccer field). A large part of
the growth in knowledge came from academic activities outside the classroom and the office,
such as seminars and talks. The department of Economics and the Weidenbaum Center at
Washington University have excelled in this matter. Also, I want to thank the staff of the
department for being flexible with all my missing deadlines, and patience when I was in need
of help.
Many friends and classmates have been instrumental to grow in the program and finish
my degree. From my brothers in arms in the first year, specially Raul Sanchez, Daniel
Garrido and Faith Tuluk (who helped me reach a higher level on the basketball court) to
the last cohort of officemates, Yinghong Zhang and Yuki Otsu. I am very happy to have
shared academic and non-academic talks with Jiemai Wu, Yu-Hung Chen, Hee-Chun Kim,
Mushegh Harutyunyan and Inkee Jang. These were my closest companions within the walls
of Seigle in the past six years. It will be hard not to have them in my life in the future. I
found in Juan Ignacio Vizcaino someone to formally pass the mantle I've been invested with
six years ago, of the one who would help to keep the balance between work and life in the
Economics Department. I only wish his Yiddish was better.
vii
I can't miss the chance to thank people I met outside the Economics Department. Both
Intervarsity groups (International Friends and Graduate Christian Fellowship) had a huge
impact in my growth as a Christian. Patricio LaRosa, Robyn Moeller, Stan Solomon and
my not-to-be-named-again ex girlfriends had been a great off-campus support and friends. I
can't stress enough how important have been for my physical and mental health the countless
hours I've spent in the last seven years chasing a ball or a disc with the Crowbar team and
the guys I play soccer with on Sunday. Blood pressure would have killed me in the last year
if it wasn't for them.
Finally, my deepest thanks go to my family and friends in Argentina. My mother Susana,
sister Pili, great-aunt Chola and dog Dotson have taken care of the tasks in the family I used
to be in charge of. I am tearful every time I regret I should have worked harder to graduate
sooner and be able to ease their burden. I stress that the sadness expressed in the previous
sentence is not something light. The deep pain in my heart from not doing this would never
go away, and hopefully would prevent me from repeating mistakes in the future. Also, my
brothers of life Juan Bautista Lavia, Ignacio Carciofi and Simon Ledesma were never far,
even when a map would say otherwise.
Nicolas Aguelakakis
Washington University in St. Louis
May 2017
viii
Dedicated to my mom, and all the people who
lent their shoulders for me to complete this
ix
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Essays on Firms and Human Behavior
by
Nicolas Aguelakakis
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
Washington University in St. Louis, 2015
Professor Brian Wade Rogers, Chair
This dissertation studies three different topics related to the economic science. In the first
chapter, it is shown that collaborations between firms can have more harmful consequences
on prices than a consolidation between them. We analyze a symmetric joint venture in which
firms facing external competition collaborate in input production. Under standard regularity
conditions, the collaboration leads to higher profits than a horizontal merger, whereas the
effect on prices and quantities depends on the form of downstream competition. When firms
compete in prices, downstream prices for all firms are higher following a symmetric joint
venture than following a merger. The reverse result may obtain under quantity competition.
In light of our results regarding profits, we provide reasons why firms might still wish to
merge: imperfect information, cost synergies, and organizational asymmetries.
On the second chapter, it is measured the impact on retail prices for a gas station if a big-
box store starts selling gasoline to consumers. To the concern of their smaller competitors
Wal-Mart, big-box stores, and other high-volume, low-price retailers have entered many
retail industries globally in recent decades. In particular, big-box stores have increased in
presence and market share in the U.S. retail gasoline industry. We examine the price impact
of these "hypermarts" on traditional gasoline retailers and find it to be economically large.
The presence of a hypermart reduces a mean retailer's profit by over one-half. This impact
x
is considerably larger than that induced by the presence of a typical retailer. We employ a
unique data set covering a medium-sized metropolitan areas: Tucson, AZ.
The third chapter investigates the effects of norms and peer pressure on the evolution
of an epidemics, and the policies that could minimize its extent. Individuals make binary
decisions regarding the level of protection from contagion and the payoffs from those decisions
would depend on the popularity of their choices. Social norms can influence the decision
both by lowering the payoffs from playing outside the norm or by lowering the probability of
interaction. I've found that the stronger the norms are, the higher the incidence of the disease
needed for agents to start protecting, but also, the eradication is easier to occur. I extend
the analysis to the asymptomatic latency case and I extend the model to include different
variations affecting the agents' decisions. Finally, I analyze different types of government
interventions to eradicate the disease.
xi
Chapter 1
Collaborate or Consolidate: Assessing
the Competitive Effects of Production
Joint Ventures
This chapter was coauthored with Aleksandr Yankelevich
1.1 Introduction
Collaboration via joint production can present an attractive alternative for rival firms con-
templating a horizontal merger, particularly for large firms concerned with an antitrust chal-
lenge. U.S. antitrust guidelines distinguish competitor collaborations from mergers, stating
that in contrast to mergers, collaborations generally preserve some form of competition
among participants.1 Production collaboration involves agreements where parties produce
through common production facilities or a jointly controlled company while remaining sep-
1See the U.S. Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (2000).
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arated in other facets of operation.2
Consider as an example, the mobile wireless industry. In the U.S., whereas small or
medium sized mergers have frequently been approved by the competition authorities, the
Department of Justice and Federal Communications Commission have been less permissive
with regard to mergers that would reduce the number of major nationwide competitors (for
instance, in 2011, blocking AT&T's attempted acquisition of T-Mobile and in 2014 showing
resistance to its potential acquisition by Sprint).3 In Europe, where nationwide merger
attempts have achieved varying degrees of success, a common alternative arrangement that
has been viewed as favorable by policy makers is for rivals to share their underlying wireless
networks while continuing to compete downstream.4 Such an arrangement has been observed
less commonly in the U.S., with the notable exception of a scrutinized and approved 2013
joint venture between the two major Alaskan-based mobile wireless providers, GCI and ACS
Wireless, who perhaps fearing that a merger between them would be disallowed due to the
presence of only one major competitor (AT&T) opted to combine their upstream assets
instead (Baker et al., 2014).5
It is by now well established in the economics literature that production collaboration
may engender anti-competitive effects as great as those of a horizontal merger (Bresnahan
and Salop, 1986; Reynolds and Snapp, 1986; O'Brien and Salop, 2000; Chen and Ross,
2003). Antitrust agencies also recognize that such collaborations can have competitive effects
2The more recent collaboration guidelines issued by Canada (2009) and the European Commission (2011)
suggest that production collaborations may vary in form and scope and include among them subcontracting
arrangements where one party retains another to produce products on its behalf.
3See Wyatt, E. Wireless Mergers Will Draw Scrutiny, Antitrust Chief Says. New York Times, B3. Jan-
uary 30, 2014. Retrieved February 15, 2016. 〈http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/01/30/wireless-mergers-
will-draw-scrutiny-antitrust-chief-says/〉.
4For instance, in its report on wireless market structure and network sharing, the OECD indicated a
preference for network sharing relative to merger. See OECD, 2014, p. 7. Annex 2 in the OECD report lists
major attempted mobile wireless mergers in the OECD between 2005 and 2014.
5In 2014, following Verizon Wireless entry into Alaska, the two companies merged. See Alaska Com-
munications to exit wireless, will sell spectrum and subs to GCI. FierceWireless. December 5, 2014. Re-
trieved February 15, 2016. 〈http://www.fiercewireless.com/story/alaska-communications-exit-wireless-will-
sell-spectrum-and-subs-gci/2014-12-05〉.
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identical to those that would arise if the participants merged and delineate circumstances
under which competitor collaborations should be treated as mergers. A prevalent view,
however, is that a production joint venture that is not found to be per se illegal, should
almost surely be allowed if the participants would be permitted to merge.6 Historically,
collaborations that are not treated as mergers have been considered to be pro-competitive
and have faced relatively few legal challenges. Notably, Werden (1998) could not identify
a single case in which a joint venture not treated as a cartel or merger was dissolved by
court order following an antitrust challenge. Similarly, in the second half of the twentieth
century, European regulators cleared or exempted almost all joint ventures that reached the
formal decision stage, while finding that the majority of horizontal cases infringed Article 81
prohibiting restriction to competition (Carree, et al., 2010).
In this manuscript, we make a positive comparison of the potential competitive impact of
production collaboration with that of a horizontal merger between two firms in an oligopoly
setting. In seeking a better understanding of production joint ventures, we find that the
treatment of joint ventures as mergers could lead antitrust practitioners to approve anti-
competitive collaborations or to deny those that may be pro-competitive. To add structure
to our analysis, we focus on production joint ventures in which the outcome of collaboration
is a product that is transferred to participants for independent marketing or used by them as
an input in the autonomous production and retail of downstream goods. Such input collab-
oration is an exceedingly common method of organization in various industries. In addition
to our aforementioned wireless industry example, other instances of input joint ventures
include collaborations between automobile manufacturers who set up joint manufacturing
facilities to produce separately branded automobiles; media proprietors who obtain news
6See, for instance, Shapiro and Willig (1990). The U.S. Guidelines for Collaborations define agreements
of a type that always or almost always tends to raise price or reduce output as per se illegal. Werden (1998)
has observed that the only per se illegal joint ventures are those that are merely cartels which involve no
efficiency-enhancing integration.
3
from jointly owned news agencies; and petroleum companies that share crude oil refining
facilities but separately market and distribute fuel.
In Section 1.2 below, we show that two firms competing in differentiated substitute
products who also face an additional oligopolistic rival would prefer to collaborate via a
symmetric input joint venture and continue to compete downstream than to merge. Unlike
a horizontal merger, which affects profits and prices by internalizing downstream competition
between the merging products, the input joint venture achieves higher industry profits via
the upstream input price. The joint venture can replicate the outcome of a horizontal merger
by raising the input price sufficiently above cost. But it can yield even higher profit by using
the input price strategically to soften competition with the outside rival.
Softening competition entails setting an input price above one that would replicate a
merger if downstream competition is in strategic complements and below it if downstream
competition is in strategic substitutes, which leads to higher prices (and hence lower con-
sumer and total welfare) when competition is differentiated Bertrand, but lower prices (and
potentially higher welfare) when competition is differentiated Cournot. The mechanism that
leads a joint venture to soften competition is reminiscent of the influence that delegation or
vertical separation has on rival firms (see Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Bonanno and Vickers,
1988). Vertical separation allows owners to act like Stackelberg leaders vis-à-vis an opposing
firm's franchise by using the input price to induce the competing franchise to raise its retail
price or lower its quantity. The joint venture attains a similar leadership position relative to
the outside competitor. However, crucially, vertical separation is absent in our modelthe
input pricing decision is made directly by the joint venture partners, not delegated to an
upstream input producer.
In light of the results in Section 1.2, one might ask why firms would merge at all when
a joint venture could lead to more profit. We contemplate a number of potential answers
in Section 1.3. First, as suggested by the literature on delegation through unobservable
4
contracts (Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989; Katz, 1991), if the input price is unobservable
to an outside rival, it cannot be used to soften competition between the collaborators and
the outsider. Second, a horizontal merger might be able to achieve greater cost synergies
than a joint venture, which could ultimately prove more profitable. Finally, when the joint
venture is asymmetric, the joint venture partners can have opposing incentives with regard
to downstream actions, which could lead to lower than merger profits. This leads us to make
some fairly straightforward policy recommendations to competition authorities.
1.2 Baseline model and equilibrium
Three firms indexed 1, 2, and 3 produce imperfectly substitutable goods. In a baseline
scenario without collaboration, every firm is vertically integrated, consisting of a separate
upstream and downstream division. Each upstream division can produce a unit of an in-
termediate good at constant marginal cost c with no constraints on capacity. Downstream
divisions require a unit of the intermediate good as an input for each unit of output sold and
have no other input requirements.7 Let wi denote the input price charged by each upstream
division to its downstream division. As in Chen and Ross (2003), who study a symmetric
industry wide input joint venture, our mathematical exposition focuses on downstream com-
petition in prices. We provide intuition for the case of downstream quantity competition
below and derive general results in the appendix.
Demand for firm i's product is given by xi = hi(p) where p = (p1, p2, p3). When
positive, demands are downward sloping (∂hi/∂pi < 0 for all i) and yield positive cross
effects (∂hi/∂pj > 0 for i 6= j). Additionally, we assume that own effects are larger than
cross effects: that is, for i 6= j, |∂hi/∂pi| > ∂hi/∂pj.
Firms 1 and 2 may be assumed to be parties to a horizontal agreement: either a merger
7We note that even if other inputs are required for downstream production, as long as the intermediate
good produced by upstream divisions cannot be substituted, our setup is without loss of generality.
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or a symmetric input joint venture (JV). The merger preserves both downstream products,
but consolidates all decisions. A JV produces and prices the requisite input to be used by
its owners, who evenly split the profits of the collaboration, but continue to compete down-
stream. It is assumed that the firm outside the JV is aware of the ownership and financial
division between the JV partners.8 Within the JV, the input is presumed homogenous, it is
bought from the JV if and only if a firm is a party to the JV, parties to the JV are obligated
to procure the input from the collaboration, and buying from or selling to outside parties
is ruled out by the collaboration contract (e.g., see Morasch, 2000). Referring back to our
earlier example of the joint venture between the two Alaskan-based mobile wireless providers
competing against AT&T, the collaborating firms stated that their JV would operate the
wireless network and charge the partner firms, who would price competing wireless plans on
a wholesale basis. The bulk of our other assumptions likewise conforms to the details of that
motivating example (see ACS, 2012).
To aid exposition, in this section, we assume that there is no efficiency gain from making
a horizontal agreementthus, c remains the same following the agreement. Likewise, we
abstract from fixed costs by supposing that additional entry into the market is not permit-
ted. Let pii(p) denote the profit of firm i and let Jp be the matrix of second-order price
partial derivatives of profits. We assume that downstream prices are strategic complements
(∂2pii/(∂pi∂pj) > 0, i 6= j) and that Jp is negative definite.9
We solve for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the following two-stage game: In
stage one, firms choose input prices. In the event that firms 1 and 2 are parties to an input
JV, the JV chooses a price w that meets the approval of both owners. In the symmetric
context discussed here, this is a price that maximizes each owner's total profit.10 Because
8Firms frequently announce the details of joint ventures and other collaborations to the public.
9Thus, profits are concave in downstream prices and there is a locally strictly stable equilibrium (even
absent firm 3).
10This is in contrast to upstream profit only, which the JV would maximize if the collaborators delegated
the input pricing decision to it a la Bonanno and Vickers (1988).
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absent capacity constraints, the optimal downstream price of a firm with complete ownership
and control over its upstream production facility is invariant to the input price set by that
facility, we suppose that a firm that is not party to a JV sets w = c. At stage two, after
learning the input prices, firms simultaneously set downstream prices.
1.2.1 Downstream competition
We first analyze the stage two equilibrium when firms 1 and 2 form a JV. Given input price
w, firms choose prices to maximize profits. The profits of firm i = 1, 2 are:
pii(p) = (pi − w)hi(p) + w − c
2
[h1(p) + h2(p)] (1.1)
Firm i derives profits from selling its output downstream as well as from its share of the JV
(though we do not assume that w ≥ c). Firm 3's profit equation is pi3(p) = (p3 − c)h3(p).
The first-order condition for the profit maximization problem of firm i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} is:
hi + (pi − w) ∂hi
∂pi
+
w − c
2
(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂pi
)
= 0 (1.2)
The first-order condition for firm 3 is h3 +(p3− c)∂h3/∂p3 = 0. Going forward, we restrict w
to an open, bounded set, Wp ∈ R, such that our assumptions on pii(p) and Jp apply. Thus,
simultaneous solutions to firms' first-order conditions lead to a strictly stable equilibrium in
prices. For a given w ∈ Wp, we denote the equilibrium price of firm i as a function of w,
pi(w). Under our profit assumptions, comparative statics show that dpi(w)/dw > 0. Higher
input prices make it more costly to produce downstream. When downstream competition
is Bertrand, this causes the JV partners' equilibrium prices to rise and because prices are
strategic complements, the outside firm responds in kind.
Next, consider the downstream game in the event of a horizontal merger between firms 1
and 2. The merged firm's profit equation is piM(p) = (p1−c)h1(p)+(p2−c)h2(p) whereas the
profit function for firm 3 remains the same as in the joint venture scenario. The first-order
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condition for product i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} becomes:
hi + (pi − c)∂hi
∂pi
+ (pj − c)∂hj
∂pi
= 0 (1.3)
Observe that as is always the case for firm 3, the merged firm's input prices cancel out of
the profit equation such that this scenario could properly be analyzed as a single-stage game
with marginal cost input pricing. The two-stage setup preserves the timing of the game
across the joint venture and horizontal merger scenarios.11
Assuming that c ∈ Wp, our profit assumptions apply, such that solutions to firms' first-
order conditions lead to a strictly stable equilibrium. We denote the equilibrium price with
regard to product i (where the merged firm controls products 1 and 2), pMi .
1.2.2 Setting the input price
In the joint venture scenario, substituting p(w) into Equation (1.1) yields firm i's (i = 1, 2)
stage one profit functions, denoted pii(p(w)). Our symmetry assumptions imply that were
the JV under the complete operational control of one of the firms (with profits split equally),
assuming price discrimination across downstream divisions is not allowed, that firm's profit
function would be the same as that of its silent JV partner. Thus, both firms would agree
to the same input price and either first-order condition dpii(p(w))/dw = 0, i = 1, 2, could
be used to determine equilibrium input price w∗.
Because our objective is to assess the competitive effects of a production JV relative
to those of a horizontal merger, before examining the solution for w∗, to aid exposition we
consider the JV's best response when firm 3 fixes its price to one that would prevail in
a merger. Define the equilibrium input price that prevails in this situation as w¯. When
firm 3's price is constant at pM3 , so that dp3/dw = 0, we can rely on symmetry (namely
11In principal, our two-stage setup in the horizontal merger and baseline scenarios result in a multiplicity
of equilibria with respect to the input prices across which all firms are indifferent. As a tie-breaking rule, we
assume marginal cost input pricing, which is implicit in the single-stage game.
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h1 = h2, dp1/dw = dp2/dw, ∂h1/∂p1 = ∂h2/∂p2, and ∂h2/∂p1 = ∂h1/∂p2) to reduce firm
i's, i 6= j = 1, 2, first-order condition to:[
hi + (pi − c)
(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂pi
)]
dpi
dw
= 0 (1.4)
Referring back to Expression (1.3) and noting that symmetry also implies that pM1 = p
M
2 , we
see that the term in square brackets in Equation (1.4) is equivalent to the first-order condition
for product i in the horizontal merger scenario. Because firm 3's price is pM3 by assumption,
it follows that pi (w¯) = p
M
i for i = 1, 2 as well. Furthermore, because pi (w¯) = p
M
i for
i = 1, 2, pM3 turns out to be firm 3's best response when the JV sets input price w¯, so that
we may write p3 (w¯) = p
M
3 . In summary:
Proposition 1. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input joint venture
and suppose that firm 3's price is fixed at pM3 . Then, the equilibrium input price, w¯, is such
that pi(w¯) = p
M
i for i = 1, 2, 3 and pi1(p(w¯)) + pi2(p(w¯)) = piM(p
M).
Proposition 1 states that when firm 3's action is fixed as if it were in the horizontal
merger scenario, the JV optimally prices the input to replicate the merger outcome. This
resembles the result obtained by Chen and Ross (2003), who show that an industry wide
input JV achieves the monopoly outcome by committing to an input price above c. As
can be seen when substituting p(w) into Equation (1.1), the commitment is facilitated by
each collaborator's ability to directly profit from increases in their JV partner's input prices,
coupled with the need to pay a higher w. As Chen and Ross point out, when w is increased
above c, the optimal prices charged by both firms rise. Even accounting for the fact that half
the JV profit will be returned to it, firm i still pays more for its inputs when w increases,
and so it buys less. As Equation (1.4) shows, when the impact of w on an outside rival is
not a concern, it is possible for the JV to achieve the same outcome that a merger attains by
internalizing downstream competition. However, in contrast to Chen and Ross (2003), the
monopoly outcome is not obtained in Proposition 1. Even though firm 3 does not behave
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strategically, it remains outside of the horizontal agreement. Hence, there is room for
improvement.
When firm 3 acts like a standard oligopoly competitor, the input price paid by the JV
partners influences its action. Firms 1 and 2 recognize this effect and consider it when setting
w. The derivative of firm i's, i 6= j = 1, 2, profit with respect to w is:
dpii(p(w))
dw
=
[
hi + (pi − c)
(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂pi
)]
dpi
dw
+ (pi − c)∂hi
∂p3
dp3
dw
(1.5)
From Equation (1.4) together with ∂hi/∂p3 > 0 and dp3/dw > 0, we know that dpii(p(w))/dw >
0 at w¯, so that the JV can outperform a merger. As the following proposition states, this
occurs at a w above w¯ and leaves all firms better off than a merger. The logic, which is laid
out more precisely in the appendix, is that the first term on the right-hand side of Equa-
tion (1.5) is positive below w¯ and negative above it and because the second term is always
positive, the first-order condition can only be satisfied at w∗ > w¯.
Proposition 2. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input joint venture
and firms compete in prices downstream. In equilibrium, w∗ > w¯ and pi(w∗) > pMi , i =
1, 2, 3. Additionally, pi1(p(w
∗)) + pi2(p(w∗)) > piM(pM) and pi3(p(w∗)) > pi3(pM).
From Proposition 1, we know that collaborators can exploit the commitment power in-
herent in a higher input price to achieve the same effect attained by complete consolidation.
Moreover, partners to a JV also understand that the input price matters to an outside
oligopolist via its effect on JV partners' downstream prices. Because downstream prices are
strategic complements, the JV partners realize that firm 3 responds to a higher input price
(which leads the collaborators to set higher downstream prices) with a higher downstream
price. Therefore, although setting the input price above one that causes the JV to replicate
a horizontal merger would lead to an unprofitable decline in the quantities of products 1 and
2 demanded absent firm 3, the effect that an increase in firm 3's price has on the demand
for products 1 and 2 makes an input price higher than w¯ worthwhile.
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As mentioned in Section 2.1, the effect that a change in w has on firm 3 is tantamount to a
Stackelberg leadership position for the JV relative to firm 3. Thus far, we have compared the
JV to a horizontal merger that continues to behave like a standard differentiated Bertrand
competitor vis-à-vis its rival post-merger. Suppose that instead, because of its newfound
size, the merger attains a Stackelberg leadership position in downstream prices relative to
firm 3 (as in Daughety, 1990; Levin, 1990). As we show by comparing first-order conditions
in the appendix, the Stackelberg leadership advantage that the JV attains via the rightmost
term in Equation (1.5) is equivalent to the downstream pricing advantage attained by a
merger that becomes a Stackelberg leader: thus, prices and profits in both scenarios turn
out to be the same.
We next briefly consider differentiated downstream quantity competition. As in the
Bertrand case, equilibrium quantities for JV partners decrease in w. However, because
quantities are strategic substitutes, firm 3, whose production costs are unchanged by the
JV, responds to lower quantities caused by a higher w by producing more. As a result, in
equilibrium, the JV profitably sets its input price below w¯ (defined in this case as the w
that prevails when firm 3 fixes its quantity to that which would prevail following a merger
between firms 1 and 2) in order to induce firm 3 to produce less.
In contrast to the Bertrand outcome, where higher prices lead to diminished consumer
and total welfare in the joint venture scenario relative to the horizontal merger, the welfare
consequences are ambiguous under Cournot competition downstream. Because the JV in-
creases its own output relative to the horizontal merger while decreasing that of its rival,
total welfare depends on the curvature of demand. As can be shown under linear demand,
the combined profits and quantities of firms 1 and 2, as well as total and consumer welfare,
are higher following a Cournot JV than following a horizontal merger. In contrast, all prices,
as well as the profit and quantity of firm 3 are lower.
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1.3 Why firms might still prefer to merge
Our results thus far indicate that ex-ante symmetric firms are better off as equal partners
in an input JV than they would be by merging. However, although symmetric JVs are
not uncommon, our results raise the question of why firms might nevertheless prefer to
merge even though mergers have historically faced more antitrust scrutiny than JVs. We
contemplate a number of potential reasons below.
Imperfect Information. Unless the JV reports the price of its inputas it might if it
stands ready to supply outside rivals12the assumption that the outside firm learns the
input price set by the JV prior to downstream competition may not be reasonable. However,
if firm 3 does not observe w, then the JV sets w taking firm 3's price as fixed. Although
in Proposition 1, we have shown that the JV retains an incentive to price the input above
marginal cost (and high enough to replicate a horizontal merger) even without eliciting a
response from firm 3, as we show in the appendix, when the input price is unobservable,
there may be no additional benefit from raising the input price above w¯. In fact, when
demand is linear, in the unique sequential equilibrium of the game of imperfect information,
the JV sets an input price of w¯ and all firms set downstream prices as if firms 1 and 2 had
merged. This result is consistent with the literature on delegation through unobservable
contracts (Coughlan and Wernerfelt, 1989; Katz, 1991), which stipulates that firms cannot
generally use unobservable contracts to induce beneficial strategic responses from their rivals.
Moreover, this result suggests that the JV cannot outperform a horizontal merger and that
if the merger can procure Stackelberg leadership, the JV underperforms.
Cost Reduction. For concision, our analysis assumed no scale economies or cost synergies,
but in reality, these are major drivers of any JV or horizontal merger agreement that hopes to
pass antitrust scrutiny. If because of its greater level of consolidation and control a merger is
12Note that this would not cause the JV input price to plummet to zero a la homogenous Bertrand
competition as long as JV partners are prohibited from buying the input from outside rivals.
12
able to reduce costs more than the JV, even if the JV is able to command higher downstream
prices, the merger may turn out to be more profitable. Consider for instance our motivating
Alaskan JV example. According to the applicants, one partner would focus on expanding
its GSM-based wireless network, whereas the other would maintain a CDMA-based network
(ACS, 2012). By way of comparison, when AT&T acquired rival Leap while continuing to
maintain its separate Cricket brand in 2014, it forced customers to transition from Leap's
CDMA-based network to AT&T's GSM-based one (Baker et al., 2014). Such a cost reducing
transition would not have been feasible in the Alaskan JV because the partners continued
to serve their own downstream wireless customers.
Asymmetric Ownership. In reality, the ownership of an input JV is not necessarily equally
distributed and this has important implications for firm profits and prices. As a simple
example, consider a partnership in which firm 1 keeps s1 ∈ (1/2, 1] of the profits from the
JV and firm 2 keeps s2 = 1− s1. Suppose further that as a result of its majority ownership,
firm 1 attains full control over w and in exchange pays a lump sum transfer to firm 2
that would leave both firms with equal expected profits.13 It turns out that the resulting
misalignment in pricing incentives brought about by such a setup leads to lower cumulative
JV partner profits than a symmetric ownership arrangement.
The intuition above depends in part on the timing of the lump sum transfer and on
how this impacts firm 1's optimization problem when setting w, a full discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this manuscript. Suppose that firm 1 sets w to maximize joint profits.
Because of its higher ownership, as s1 rises, firm 1 is induced to lower its downstream price
(and w) relative to the symmetric case to raise demand for the input. Due to its lower
ownership, firm 2 is induced to focus more on downstream profit and possibly to raise its
downstream price, though the extent of that increase is constrained by firm 1's lower price
13Such an arrangement might result if one partner to a JV is debt constrained at the time that the
transaction is consummated.
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(as is the price of firm 3). The culmination of this incentive misalignment can lead to lower
average prices than following a symmetric JV and can result in lower cumulative profits than
following a merger. The price implications of such a misalignment may have contributed to
agency approval of the Alaskan JV, whose ownership was split 2/3 and 1/3.
Our findings lead us to make a number of straightforward recommendations to antitrust
agencies. First, in contrast to the takeaway from previous literature on production collabo-
ration (Shapiro and Willig, 1990; Chen and Ross, 2003) it should not be taken for granted
that were a merger to be approved that a joint venture should be likewise approved. In
contrast to prior literature, we find that the JV can result in higher than merger prices
when downstream competition is differentiated Bertrand. However, even if competition is
Cournot, because an outside rival ends up with lower profits following a JV than following
a merger, agencies should be wary to the extent that its solvency is threatened more by the
JV. Additionally, agencies should take into account that a joint venture might not be able to
reduce costs as much as a merger, which could lead the latter to be preferable to firms and
consumers.14 Perhaps more subtly, this manuscript suggests that agencies should consider
the organization and transparency of the JV. A more symmetric JV is better able to align
on higher prices. Moreover, greater transparency regarding the JV's price setting is more
likely to soften competition with outside rivals, potentially leading to higher than merger
pricing.
1.4 Appendix
Before we set out to prove the various results and propositions laid out in our manuscript,
we restate some of our earlier assumptions using a more general formulation. Three firms
14A related concern that is outside the scope of our model is that a joint venture might forestall investment.
This issue was raised recently by French regulator ARCEP with regard to the type of wireless network joint
ventures described in this manuscript (ARCEP, 2016).
14
indexed 1, 2, and 3 produce imperfectly substitutable goods. Firms are vertically integrated
and consist of a separate upstream and downstream division. Each upstream division can
produce a unit of an intermediate good at the same constant marginal cost c and with no
constraints on capacity. Downstream divisions require one unit of the intermediate good
as an input for each unit of output that they produce. Downstream divisions have no
other input requirements. Let wi denote the input price charged by each upstream division
to its downstream division. Let θi denote the action of the downstream division and let
θ = (θ1, θ2, θ3) be the profile of all downstream actions. Downstream actions may represent
prices, pi or quantities, xi.
On the other side of the market, we have a representative consumer who maximizes{
U(x)− p · x : x ∈ R3+
}
, where U(·) is a symmetric, C3 (differentially) strictly concave util-
ity on R3+, which is (differentially) strictly increasing in a non-empty, bounded set X ⊂ R3+.
The utility maximizing consumer gives rise to an inverse demand function fi for each good i,
which is C2 on the interior of X and decreasing in all its arguments (∂fi/∂xj < 0 for all j).
The system of inverse demands can be inverted to yield direct demand functions xi = hi(p)
which are C2 in the interior of the region of price space for which demands are positive (de-
note the region P ). When positive, direct demands are downward sloping (∂hi/∂pi < 0 for
all i) and yield positive cross effects (∂hi/∂pj > 0 for i 6= j). We assume that own effects are
larger than cross effects: that is, for i 6= j, |∂fi/∂xi| > |∂fi/∂xj| and |∂hi/∂pi| > ∂hi/∂pj.
Firms 1 and 2 either merge or join a symmetric input joint venture (JV). A merger
preserves both downstream products, but consolidates all decisions. A JV produces and
prices the requisite input to be used by its owners, who evenly split the profits of the
collaboration, but continue to compete against each other downstream. It is assumed that
the firm outside a JV is aware of the ownership and financial division between the JV
partners. Within the JV, the input is presumed homogenous, it is bought from the JV if
and only if a firm is a party to the JV, parties to the JV are obligated to procure their
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input from the collaboration, and buying from or selling to outside parties is ruled out by
the collaboration contract. Additionally, the marginal cost c of producing the intermediate
good does not change in the event of a merger or JV and there are no fixed costs.
For notational convenience, firm profits are written as pii whether firms compete in prices
or quantities downstream. Henceforth, the arguments of the profit function will be used
to denote the appropriate competitive scenario: pii(p) for Bertrand, pii(x) for Cournot, and
pii(θ) when an expression might apply to either. Moreover, the arguments will be suppressed
wherever they are self-evident. Regardless of whether we analyze the baseline or a scenario
with a horizontal agreement, we make the following additional assumptions on firm profits,
which should be taken to apply to all p in the interior of P or all x in the interior of X as
appropriate:
Assumption 1. Firm profits are concave in downstream actions: ∂2pii/∂θ
2
i < 0.
Assumption 2. Downstream, prices are strategic complements and quantities are strategic
substitutes. That is, for i, j = 1, 2, 3, i 6= j:
∂2pii
∂pi∂pj
> 0 ,
∂2pii
∂xi∂xj
< 0 .
Consider the Jacobian matrix of the vector of own partials of firm profits:
Jθ =

∂2pi1
∂θ21
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1
∂2pi2
∂θ22
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ2
∂2pi3
∂θ23

Assumption 3. The following stability relationships hold:
1. The determinant of Jθ, |Jθ|, is negative,
2.
∂2pi1
∂θ21
∂2pi2
∂θ22
>
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1
.
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Observe that the first item in Assumption 3 is necessary for the existence of a locally
strictly stable equilibrium while the second item preserves this stability in the absence of
firm 3. Assumptions 1 and 3 are necessary and sufficient for Jθ to be negative definite.
Firms play the following two-stage game: In the first stage, firms choose input prices.
In the event that firms 1 and 2 are parties to an input JV, the JV chooses a price w that
meets the approval of both owners. In the symmetric context discussed here, this is a price
that maximizes each owner's total profit. Because absent capacity constraints, the optimal
downstream price of a firm with complete ownership and control over its upstream production
facility is invariant to the input price set by that facility, we suppose that a firm that is not
party to a JV sets w = c. At stage two, after learning the input prices, firms simultaneously
set downstream prices. The equilibrium concept is SPNE.
Firm profits
Suppose that firms 1 and 2 form a JV. Given an input price w, if firms compete in prices
downstream, the profits of firm i = 1, 2 are:
pii(p) = (pi − w)hi(p) + w − c
2
[h1(p) + h2(p)] (A1)
Firm 3's profit equation is given by pi3(p) = (p3 − c)h3(p).
When firms compete in quantities downstream, the profits of firm i = 1, 2 are:
pii(x) = [fi(x)− w]xi + w − c
2
(x1 + x2) (A2)
while firm 3's profit becomes pi3(x) = [f3(x)− c]x3.
Let gθ = (∂pi1/∂θ1, ∂pi2/∂θ2, ∂pi3/∂θ3). The first-order conditions to firms' profit max-
imization problems in, respectively, the Bertrand and Cournot competitive scenarios are:
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gp (p, w)=

h1+(p1 − w) ∂h1/∂p1+(w − c) (∂h1/∂p1+∂h2/∂p1)/2
h2+(p2 − w) ∂h2/∂p2+(w − c) (∂h1/∂p2+∂h2/∂p2)/2
h3 + (p3 − c)∂h3/∂p3
=

0
0
0
 (A3)
gx (x, w) =

(∂f1/∂x1)x1 + f1 − w + (w − c)/2
(∂f2/∂x2)x2 + f2 − w + (w − c)/2
(∂f3/∂x3)x3 + f3 − c
 =

0
0
0
 (A4)
Going forward, we restrict w to an open, bounded set,Wp orWx in R, such that Assump-
tions 1, 2, and 3 apply to Bertrand or Cournot competition, respectively. Thus, simultaneous
solutions to firm first-order conditions as specified by Expressions (A3) or (A4) lead to a
strictly stable equilibrium in prices or quantities, respectively. For a given w ∈ Wθ, we
denote the equilibrium action of firm i as a function of w, θi(w).
Suppose instead that firms 1 and 2 merge. The merged firm's Bertrand profit equation
is piM(p) = (p1 − c)h1(p) + (p2 − c)h2(p) and its Cournot profit equation is piM(x) =
[f1(x)− c]x1 + [f2(x)− c]x2. The profit functions for firm 3 remain the same as in the joint
venture scenario.
Let gMθ be the vector of own partials of firm profits in the merger scenario. The first-order
conditions in, respectively, the Bertrand and Cournot scenarios become:
gMp (p, w) =

h1 + (p1 − c)∂h1/∂p1 + (p2 − c)∂h2/∂p1
(p1 − c)∂h1/∂p2 + h2 + (p2 − c)∂h2/∂p2
h3 + (p3 − c)∂h3/∂p3
 =

0
0
0
 (A5)
gMx (x, w) =

(∂f1/∂x1)x1 + f1 − c+ (∂f2/∂x1)x2
(∂f1/∂x2)x1 + (∂f2/∂x2)x2 + f2 − c
(∂f3/∂x3)x3 + f3 − c
 =

0
0
0
 (A6)
Observe that the gMθ are only artificially functions of w, which in this case we interpret as the
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input price paid by the downstream divisions of the horizontally merged firm. Assuming that
c ∈ Wθ, Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 apply, such that simultaneous solutions to firm first-order
conditions as specified by Expressions (A5) or (A6) lead to a strictly stable equilibrium in
prices or quantities, respectively. We denote the equilibrium action with regard to product
i (where the merged firm controls products 1 and 2), θMi .
Comparative statics
Lemma 1. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input joint venture. If
Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold, then:
1. Under downstream Bertrand competition, equilibrium prices increase in w.
2. Under downstream Cournot competition, the equilibrium quantities of firms 1 and 2
decrease in w and the equilibrium quantity of firm 3 increases in w.
Proof. Let p∗ and x∗, represent the values of p and x such that gp (p∗, w) = 0 and
gx (x
∗, w) = 0. Note that gp and gx map from, respectively, int P ×Wp and int X ×Wx
into R3+. Additionally, define Dwgθ as the column vector of own partials differentiated with
respect to w. That is,
Dwgθ =
(
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂w
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂w
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂w
)T
From our assumptions on utility along with Assumption 3, we know that we can apply the
implicit function theorem to obtain the derivative of firm actions with respect to w. In
particular, θ∗ = θ(w) and θ′(w) = − (Jθ)−1Dwgθ. Observe that (Jθ)−1 = (Cθ)T / |Jθ|
where Cθ is the following cofactor matrix:
∂2pi2
∂θ22
∂2pi3
∂θ23
− ∂
2pi2
∂θ2∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ2
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
− ∂
2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1
∂2pi3
∂θ23
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ2
− ∂
2pi2
∂θ22
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ2
− ∂
2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
∂2pi3
∂θ23
∂2pi1
∂θ21
∂2pi3
∂θ23
− ∂
2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
− ∂
2pi1
∂θ21
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ2
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ3
− ∂
2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi2
∂θ22
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1
− ∂
2pi1
∂θ21
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ3
∂2pi1
∂θ21
∂2pi2
∂θ22
− ∂
2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1

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Our symmetry assumptions on utility, marginal costs, and the division of JV profits
imply that θ∗1 = θ
∗
2 along with the following equilibrium relationships on demand and inverse
demand: ∂h1
∂p1
=
∂h2
∂p2
,
∂h1
∂p2
=
∂h2
∂p1
,
∂h1
∂p3
=
∂h2
∂p3
,
∂h3
∂p1
=
∂h3
∂p2
∂f1
∂x1
=
∂f2
∂x2
,
∂f1
∂x2
=
∂f2
∂x1
,
∂f1
∂x3
=
∂f2
∂x3
,
∂f3
∂x1
=
∂f3
∂x2
∂2h1
∂p21
=
∂2h2
∂p22
,
∂2h1
∂p22
=
∂2h2
∂p21
,
∂2f1
∂x21
=
∂2f2
∂x22
,
∂2f1
∂x22
=
∂2f2
∂x21
∂2h1
∂p1∂p2
=
∂2h2
∂p1∂p2
,
∂2h1
∂p1∂p3
=
∂2h2
∂p2∂p3
,
∂2h1
∂p2∂p3
=
∂2h2
∂p1∂p3
,
∂2h3
∂p3∂p1
=
∂2h3
∂p3∂p2
∂2f1
∂x1∂x2
=
∂2f2
∂x1∂x2
,
∂2f1
∂x1∂x3
=
∂2f2
∂x2∂x3
,
∂2f1
∂x2∂x3
=
∂2f2
∂x1∂x3
,
∂2f3
∂x3∂x1
=
∂2f3
∂x3∂x2
Our symmetry assumptions also imply the following profit relationships:
∂2pi1
∂θ21
=
∂2pi2
∂θ22
,
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
=
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ1
,
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂w
=
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂w
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
=
∂2pi2
∂θ2∂θ3
,
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
=
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ2
Applying the profit relationships above to Jθ and Cθ reduces |Jθ| to:
|Jθ| =
[
∂2pi3
∂θ23
(
∂2pi1
∂θ21
+
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
)
− 2 ∂
2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
](
∂2pi1
∂θ21
− ∂
2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
)
(A7)
and θ′(w) to:
θ′(w) =

∂2pi1
∂θ1∂w
∂2pi3
∂θ23
/[
2
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
− ∂
2pi3
∂θ23
(
∂2pi1
∂θ21
+
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
)]
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂w
∂2pi3
∂θ23
/[
2
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
− ∂
2pi3
∂θ23
(
∂2pi1
∂θ21
+
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
)]
2
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂w
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
/[∂2pi3
∂θ23
(
∂2pi1
∂θ21
+
∂2pi1
∂θ1∂θ2
)
− 2 ∂
2pi1
∂θ1∂θ3
∂2pi3
∂θ3∂θ1
]

Bertrand : The expression for ∂2pi1/∂θ1∂w reduces to:
∂2pi1
∂p1∂w
=
1
2
(
∂h2
∂p1
− ∂h1
∂p1
)
,
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which is positive on P . As a result, from Assumption 1 we know that the numerator in
p′1(w) = p
′
2(w) is negative whereas from Assumption 2 for Bertrand competition (strategic
complementarity), we know the numerator in p′3(w) is positive. Moreover, Assumptions 1 and
2 imply that the rightmost parenthetical expression on the right-hand side of Equation (A7)
is negative so that by Assumption 3, the denominator in p′1(w) = p
′
2(w) is negative and the
denominator in p′3(w) is positive.
Cournot : The expression for ∂2pi1/∂θ1∂w now becomes simply ∂
2pi1/∂x1∂w = −(1/2).
Therefore, from Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 for Cournot competition (strategic substi-
tutability), we know that all the numerators in x′(w) are positive. Applying our symmetric
profit relationships, we can rewrite the inequality found in the second item of Assumption 3
as: (
∂2pi1
∂x21
+
∂2pi1
∂x1∂x2
)(
∂2pi1
∂x21
− ∂
2pi1
∂x1∂x2
)
> 0 (A8)
Assumptions 1 and 2 imply that the leftmost parenthetical expression on the left-hand side of
Inequality (A8) is negative, which implies the same for the remaining parenthetical expression
in the inequality. Observe that the latter parenthetical expression is the Cournot variant
of the rightmost parenthetical expression on the right-hand side of Equation (A7), so that
according to the first item of Assumption 3, the denominator in x′1(w) = x
′
2(w) is negative
and the denominator in x′3(w) is positive.
Main Results
Proposition 1. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input joint venture
and suppose that firm 3's action is fixed at θM3 . Then, the equilibrium input price, w¯, is such
that θi(w¯) = θ
M
i for i = 1, 2, 3 and pi1(θ(w¯)) + pi2(θ(w¯)) = piM(θ
M).
Proof. We approach the proofs for the Bertrand and Cournot scenarios in turn:
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Bertrand : When firm 3's price is constant at pM3 , firm i's, i 6= j = 1, 2, first-order condition
becomes:
dpii(p(w))
dw
=
dpi
dw
hi +
1
2
(hj − hi) + (pi − w)
(
∂hi
∂pi
dpi
dw
+
∂hi
∂pj
dpj
dw
)
+
w − c
2
[(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂pi
)
dpi
dw
+
(
∂hi
∂pj
+
∂hj
∂pj
)
dpj
dw
]
= 0
(A9)
Symmetry implies that in equilibrium, h1 = h2, dp1/dw = dp2/dw, ∂h1/∂p1 = ∂h2/∂p2, and
∂h2/∂p1 = ∂h1/∂p2. As a result, Equation (A9) reduces to:
hi + (pi − c)
(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂pi
)
= 0 (A10)
Referring back to Expression (A5) and noting that symmetry also implies that pM1 = p
M
2
(or alternatively, that p1 (w¯) = p2 (w¯)), we see that Equation (A10) is equivalent to the
first-order condition for product i in the horizontal merger scenario. Because firm 3's price
is pM3 by assumption, it follows that pi (w¯) = p
M
i for i = 1, 2 as well. Furthermore, be-
cause pi (w¯) = p
M
i for i = 1, 2, p
M
3 turns out to be firm 3's best response when the JV sets
input price w¯, so that we may write p3 (w¯) = p
M
3 . Consequently, pi1(p(w¯)) + pi2(p(w¯)) =
(p1 − c)h1(p(w¯)) + (p2 − c)h2(p(w¯)) = piM(pM).
Cournot : The Cournot proof is analogous to its Bertrand counterpart. That is, when firm
3's quantity is constant at xM3 , firm i's, i 6= j = 1, 2, first-order condition becomes:
dpii(x(w))
dw
=
(
∂fi
∂xi
dxi
dw
+
∂fi
∂xj
dxj
dw
)
xi + (fi − w) dxi
dw
+
1
2
(xj − xi) + w − c
2
(
dxi
dw
+
dxj
dw
)
= 0
(A11)
Symmetry implies that in equilibrium, x1 (w¯) = x2 (w¯) and dx1/dw = dx2/dw. As a result,
Equation (A11) reduces to:
fi − c+ xi
(
∂fi
∂xi
+
∂fi
∂xj
)
= 0 (A12)
Referring back to Expression (A6) and noting that symmetry also implies that ∂f2/∂x1 =
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∂f1/∂x2 and x
M
1 = x
M
2 , we see that Equation (A12) is equivalent to the first-order con-
dition for product i in the horizontal merger scenario. Because firm 3's quantity is xM3
by assumption, it follows that xi (w¯) = x
M
i for i = 1, 2 as well. Furthermore, because
xi (w¯) = x
M
i for i = 1, 2, x
M
3 turns out to be firm 3's best response when the JV sets
input price w¯, so that we may write x3 (w¯) = x
M
3 . Consequently, pi1(x(w¯)) + pi2(x(w¯)) =
[f1(x(w¯))− c]x1 + [f2(x(w¯))− c]x2 = piM(xM).
Proposition 2 (Bertrand). Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input
joint venture and firms compete in prices downstream. In equilibrium, w∗ > w¯ and pi(w∗) >
pMi , i = 1, 2, 3. Additionally, pi1(p(w
∗)) + pi2(p(w∗)) > piM(pM) and pi3(p(w∗)) > pi3(pM).
Proof. The change in firm i's, i 6= j = 1, 2, profit with respect to w can be written:
dpii(p(w))
dw
=
dpi
dw
hi +
1
2
(hj − hi) + (pi − w)
(
∂hi
∂pi
dpi
dw
+
∂hi
∂pj
dpj
dw
)
+
w − c
2
[(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂pi
)
dpi
dw
+
(
∂hi
∂pj
+
∂hj
∂pj
)
dpj
dw
]
+ (pi − w) ∂hi
∂p3
dp3
dw
+
w − c
2
(
∂hi
∂p3
+
∂hj
∂p3
)
dp3
dw
(A13)
Symmetry implies that in equilibrium, h1 = h2, dp1/dw = dp2/dw, ∂h1/∂p1 = ∂h2/∂p2,
∂h2/∂p1 = ∂h1/∂p2, and ∂h1/∂p3 = ∂h2/∂p3. As a result, Equation (A13) reduces to:
dpii(p(w))
dw
=
[
hi + (pi − c)
(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂pi
)]
dpi
dw
+ (pi − c)∂hi
∂p3
dp3
dw
(A14)
Substituting w¯ into Equation (A14) and applying Proposition 1 yields:
dpii(p(w))
dw
∣∣∣∣
w¯
= (pi − c) ∂hi
∂p3
dp3
dw
∣∣∣∣
w¯
> 0 (A15)
where the inequality follows by our assumption that products are gross substitutes and from
the first item in Lemma 1. The inequality in Expression (A15) tells us that w¯ does not lead
to an optimum in the complete game so that by definition, pii(p(w
∗)) > pii(p(w¯)) for i = 1, 2
and by Proposition 1, pi1(p(w
∗)) + pi2(p(w∗)) > piM(pM).
Now suppose that contrary to the statement of the Proposition, w∗ < w¯. This leads to
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the following contradiction:
pi1(p(w
∗)) + pi2(p(w∗)) = piM(p(w∗))
< piM(p1(w
∗), p2(w∗), p3(w¯))
< piM(p(w¯))
= piM(p
M) < pi1(p(w
∗)) + pi2(p(w∗))
The initial equality follows from symmetry. The first inequality follows from Lemma 1
(whereby w∗ < w¯ implies that p3(w∗) < p3(w¯)) together with gross substitutability. The
remaining relations follow from Proposition 1. We have thus proven that w∗ > w¯. From
Lemma 1 it follows that pi(w
∗) > pMi , i = 1, 2, 3.
It remains to show that pi3(p(w
∗)) > pi3(pM). The change in firm 3's profit with respect
to w is given by:
dpi3(p(w))
dw
=
dp3
dw
h3 + (p3 − c)
(
∂h3
∂p1
dp1
dw
+
∂h3
∂p2
dp2
dw
+
∂h3
∂p3
dp3
dw
)
= (p3 − c)
(
∂h3
∂p1
dp1
dw
+
∂h3
∂p2
dp2
dw
)
> 0
The second equality follows from firm 3's second stage first-order condition (see Expres-
sion (A3)) and the inequality follows from Lemma 1 together with gross substitutability.
The proof follows from Proposition 1 because w∗ > w¯.
Proposition 2 (Cournot). Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input
joint venture and firms compete in quantities downstream. In equilibrium, w¯ > w∗ and
xi(w
∗) > xMi , i = 1, 2 whereas x
M
3 > x3(w
∗). Additionally, pi1(x(w∗))+pi2(x(w∗)) > piM(xM)
whereas pi3(x
M) > pi3(x(w
∗)).
Proof. The change in firm i's, i 6= j = 1, 2, profit with respect to w can be written:
dpii(x(w))
dw
=
(
∂fi
∂xi
dxi
dw
+
∂fi
∂xj
dxj
dw
+
∂fi
∂x3
dx3
dw
)
xi
+ (fi − w) dxi
dw
+
1
2
(xj − xi) + w − c
2
(
dxi
dw
+
dxj
dw
) (A16)
Symmetry implies that in equilibrium, x1 (w
∗) = x2 (w∗) and dx1/dw = dx2/dw. As a result,
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Equation (A16) reduces to:
dpii(x(w))
dw
=
[
fi − c+ xi
(
∂fi
∂xi
+
∂fi
∂xj
)]
dxi
dw
+ xi
∂fi
∂x3
dx3
dw
(A17)
Substituting w¯ into Equation (A17) and applying Proposition 1 yields:
dpii(x(w))
dw
∣∣∣∣
w¯
= xi
∂fi
∂x3
dx3
dw
∣∣∣∣
w¯
< 0 (A18)
where the inequality follows by our assumption that products are substitutes and from the
second item in Lemma 1. The inequality in Expression (A18) tells us that w¯ does not lead
to an optimum in the complete game so that by definition, pii(x(w
∗)) > pii(x(w¯)) for i = 1, 2
and by Proposition 1, pi1(x(w
∗)) + pi2(x(w∗)) > piM(xM).
Now suppose that contrary to the statement of the Proposition, w¯ < w∗. This leads to
the following contradiction:
pi1(x(w
∗)) + pi2(x(w∗)) = piM(x(w∗))
< piM(x1(w
∗), x2(w∗), x3(w¯))
< piM(x(w¯))
= piM(x
M) < pi1(x(w
∗)) + pi2(x(w∗))
The initial equality follows from symmetry. The first inequality follows from Lemma 1
(whereby w¯ < w∗ implies that x3(w¯) < x3(w∗)) together with substitutability. The remaining
relations follow from Proposition 1. We have thus proven that w¯ > w∗. From Lemma 1 it
follows that xi(w
∗) > xMi , i = 1, 2 and x
M
3 > x3(w
∗).
It remains to show that pi3(x
M) > pi3(x(w
∗)). The change in firm 3's profit with respect
to w is given by:
dpi3(x(w))
dw
= x3
(
∂f3
∂x1
dx1
dw
+
∂f3
∂x2
dx2
dw
+
∂f3
∂x3
dx3
dw
)
+ (f3 − c)dx3
dw
= x3
(
∂f3
∂x1
dx1
dw
+
∂f3
∂x2
dx2
dw
)
> 0
The second equality follows from firm 3's second stage first-order condition (see Expres-
sion (A4)) and the inequality follows from Lemma 1 together with substitutability. The
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proof follows from Proposition 1 because w¯ > w∗.
Proposition 3. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input joint venture.
Then, in equilibrium, firm downstream actions and profits are the same as those that would
result had firm 1 and 2 merged and obtained a Stackelberg leadership advantage with respect
to firm 3.
Proof. We approach the proofs for the Bertrand and Cournot scenarios in turn:
Bertrand : Suppose that a merged firm consisting of firms 1 and 2 becomes a Stackelberg
leader. Working backwards, firm 3 maximizes its profit as a function of p1 and p2 by solving
its first-order condition given in Expression (A5) to yield equilibrium price p3(p1, p2). Taking
p3(p1, p2) into account, the merged firm's profit equation becomes piM(p1, p2, p3(p1, p2)) =
(p1−c)h1(p1, p2, p3(p1, p2))+(p2−c)h2(p1, p2, p3(p1, p2)). Its first-order condition for prod-
uct i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} becomes:
hi + (pi − c)
(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hi
∂p3
∂p3
∂pi
)
+ (pj − c)
(
∂hj
∂pi
+
∂hj
∂p3
∂p3
∂pi
)
= 0 (A19)
Now suppose instead that firms 1 and 2 join a symmetric JV. Recall that the derivative
of JV partner profits with respect to w can be written according to Equation (A14) in the
proof of Proposition 2 (Bertrand). By using the envelope theorem, the right most derivative
in Equation (A14) can be written:
dp3
dw
=
∂p3
∂p1
dp1
dw
+
∂p3
∂p2
dp2
dw
(A20)
Substituting back into Equation (A14) and relying on symmetry, the first-order condition
for JV firm i 6= j ∈ {1, 2} becomes:
dp1
dw
[
hi + (pi − c)
(
∂hi
∂pi
+
∂hi
∂p3
∂p3
∂pi
)
+ (pi − c)
(
∂hi
∂pj
+
∂hi
∂p3
∂p3
∂pj
)]
= 0 (A21)
Symmetry implies that the square bracket term in Equation (A21) is equal to the left-hand
side in Equation (A19), completing the proof.
26
Cournot : The Cournot proof proceeds its Bertrand counterpart, but instead relying on
Expression (A6) in place of Expression (A5) and Equation (A17) in the proof of Proposition 2
(Cournot) in place of Equation (A14).
Linear Example
Consider our general model with the following quadratic utility specification:
U (x) = α (x1 + x2 + x3)− κ
(
x21 + x
2
2 + x
2
3
)
/2− β (x1x2 + x1x3 + x3x2) (A22)
where α, κ, and β are positive and κ > β. This utility function gives rise to a linear demand
structure with the inverse demand for product i given by:
pi = α− κxi − β
∑
j 6=i
xj (A23)
in the region ofX where prices are positive. Solving the system of 3 inverse demand equations
for i = 1, 2, 3 yields the direct demand for product i in the region of P over which quantities
are positive:
xi = a− kpi + b
∑
j 6=i
pj (A24)
where we write α = a/(k − 2b), κ = (k − b)/ [(k + b)(k − 2b)], and β = b/ [(k + b)(k − 2b)],
and where a, k, and b are positive and k > 2b. In addition to our utility assumptions,
without loss of generality, suppose that the marginal cost c is zero.
Working backwards, given an input price wp ∈ Wp or wx ∈ Wx, we can solve firms'
first-order conditions under Bertrand (Expression (A3)) or Cournot (Expression (A4)) com-
petition, respectively to yield firms' conditional equilibrium actions. Specifically, for i = 1, 2
these are
pi(wp) =
a
2(k − b) +
k(k + b)wp
2(2k + b)(k − b) ,
p3(wp) =
a
2(k − b) +
b(k + b)wp
2(2k + b)(k − b)
(A25)
under Bertrand competition and
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xi(wx) =
α
2(κ+ β)
− κwx
2(2κ− β)(κ+ β) ,
x3(wx) =
α
2(κ+ β)
+
βwx
2(2κ− β)(κ+ β)
(A26)
under Cournot competition. Observe that because k > 2b > 0 and κ > β > 0, pi(wp) >
p3(wp) for any wp > 0 and xi(wx) < x3(wx) for any wx > 0.
We can now substitute p(wp) into Equation (A1) and x(wx) into Equation (A2) to solve
for the equilibrium input prices:
w∗p =
a(2k + b)b
2(k2 − bk − b2)k , w
∗
x =
α(κ− β)(2κ− β)β
2(κ2 + κβ − β2) (A27)
which are both positive given our assumptions on utility. Substituting w∗p and w
∗
x into
Equations (A25) and (A26), respectively, we can obtain the JV equilibrium prices, quantities,
and profits under Bertrand and Cournot competition.
Proposition 4. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input joint venture
and that firms face linear demand. In equilibrium, the combined profits of firms 1 and 2 are
higher than the profits of a horizontal merger between firms 1 and 2. Additionally:
1. Under downstream Bertrand competition, the equilibrium profit and quantity of firm
3 and all prices are higher than in the horizontal merger scenario. The quantities of
products 1 and 2 and total and consumer welfare are lower.
2. Under downstream Cournot competition, the equilibrium quantities of firms 1 and 2
and total and consumer welfare are higher than in the horizontal merger scenario. All
prices, as well as the profit and quantity of firm 3 are lower.
Proof. Using Table 1.1, we can compare prices, quantities, and profits for firms i = 1, 2
and 3 in the joint venture scenario with the corresponding variables had firms 1 and 2
merged instead when all firms compete in prices downstream. The superscriptMp represents
the merger scenario with downstream Bertrand competition. The results regarding prices,
quantities, and profits are now easily confirmed by comparing each row.
28
Table 1.1: Bertrand Equilibrium: Joint Venture vs. Horizontal Merger
Joint Venture Horizontal Merger
pi(w
∗
p) =
a(2k + b)
4(k2 − kb− b2) p
Mp
i =
a(2k + b)
2(2k2 − 2kb− b2)
Firm i xi(w
∗
p) =
a(2k + b)
4k
x
Mp
i =
a(2k + b)(k − b)
2(2k2 − 2kb− b2)
pii(p(w
∗
p)) =
a2(2k + b)2
16k(k2 − kb− b2) piM(p
Mp) =
a2(2k + b)2(k − b)
2(2k2 − 2kb− b2)2
p3(w
∗
p) =
a(2k2 − b2)
4k(k2 − kb− b2) p
Mp
3 =
ak
2k2 − 2kb− b2
Firm 3 x3(w
∗
p) =
a(2k2 − b2)
4(k2 − kb− b2) x
Mp
3 =
ak2
2k2 − 2kb− b2
pi3(p(w
∗
p)) =
a2(2k2 − b2)2
16k(k2 − kb− b2)2 pi3(p
Mp) =
a2k3
(2k2 − 2kb− b2)2
To see that consumer and total welfare are lower in the joint venture scenario than in
the horizontal merger scenario, we substitute the equilibrium quantities in Table 1.1 into
Equation (A22) and rewrite α, κ, and β in terms of a, k, and b. Total welfare is lower in the
joint venture scenario than in the horizontal merger scenario if U
(
x(w∗p)
)
< U
(
xMp
)
. After
some straightforward algebraic manipulation, this inequality reduces to:
−a2b2(2k + b) (16k5 − 32k4b− 20k3b2 + 30k2b3 + 24kb4 + 5b5)
32k (2k2 − 2kb− b2)2 (k2 − bk − b2)2 < 0 (A28)
Similarly, consumer welfare is lower in the joint venture scenario than in the horizontal
merger scenario if U
(
x(w∗p)
)−p(w∗p) ·x(w∗p) < U (xMp)−pMp ·xMp , which may be rewritten
as: −a2b2(2k + b) (16k5 − 16k4b− 28k3b2 + 10k2b3 + 16kb4 + 3b5)
32k (2k2 − 2kb− b2)2 (k2 − bk − b2)2 < 0 (A29)
Without loss of generality, we may normalize k to 1 in Inequalities (A28) and (A29) to see
that under our assumptions (in particular, b < k/2), total and consumer welfare decline
when firms 1 and 2 form a JV instead of merging horizontally and firms compete in prices
downstream.
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Table 1.2 presents the analogous price, quantity, and profit comparison to Table 1.1 in
the event of quantity competition downstream. The superscript Mx represents the merger
scenario with downstream Cournot competition. We can now similarly confirm the results
regarding prices, quantities, and profits under Cournot competition downstream.
Table 1.2: Cournot Equilibrium: Joint Venture vs. Horizontal Merger
Joint Venture Horizontal Merger
pi(w
∗
x) =
α(2κ− β)
4κ
pMxi =
α(2κ− β)(κ+ β)
2(2κ2 + 2κβ − β2)
Firm i xi(w
∗
x) =
α(2κ− β)
4(κ2 + κβ − β2) x
Mx
i =
α(2κ− β)
2(2κ2 + 2κβ − β2)
pii(x(w
∗
x)) =
α2(2κ− β)2
16κ(κ2 + κβ − β2) piM(x
Mx) =
α2(2κ− β)2(κ+ β)
2(2κ2 + 2κβ − β2)2
p3(w
∗
x) =
α(2κ2 − β2)
4(κ2 + κβ − β2) p
Mx
3 =
ακ2
2κ2 + 2κβ − β2
Firm 3 x3(w
∗
x) =
α(2κ2 − β2)
4κ(κ2 + κβ − β2) x
Mx
3 =
ακ
2κ2 + 2κβ − β2
pi3(x(w
∗
x)) =
α2(2κ2 − β2)2
16κ(κ2 + κβ − β2)2 pi3(x
Mx) =
α2κ3
(2κ2 + 2κβ − β2)2
Total welfare is higher in the joint venture scenario than in the horizontal merger scenario
if the following inequality holds:
α2β2(2κ− β) (16κ5 + 16κ4β − 28κ3β2 − 10β3κ2 + 16κβ4 − 3β5)
32κ (κ2 + κβ − β2)2 (2κ2 + 2βκ− β2)2 > 0 (A30)
Likewise, consumer welfare is higher in the joint venture scenario than in the horizontal
merger scenario if:
α2β2(2κ− β) (16κ5 + 32κ4β − 20κ3β2 − 30β3κ2 + 24κβ4 − 5β5)
32κ (κ2 + κβ − β2)2 (2κ2 + 2βκ− β2)2 > 0 (A31)
Without loss of generality, we may normalize κ to 1 in Inequalities (A30) and (A31) to see
that total and consumer welfare increase when firms 1 and 2 form a JV instead of merging
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horizontally and firms compete in quantities downstream.
Extensions (Why firms merge)
Imperfect Information . Suppose that firm 3 does not learn the input price set by the JV
prior to downstream competition taking place. Let γ ∈ Wθ represent firm 3's belief regarding
w and let θi(θj, θ3; w, γ) represent the best response of firm i 6= j = 1, 2 given any w ∈ Wθ
and γ. Let θ˜(w, γ) solve θ˜(w, γ) = θi(θ˜(w, γ), θ3(γ); w, γ).
15
Proposition 5. Suppose that firms 1 and 2 collaborate in a symmetric input joint venture
in the two stage imperfect information game. Then the assessment consisting of the joint
venture playing w¯, followed by firms 1 and 2 playing θ˜(w, γ) for any w and firm 3 playing
θ3(w¯) accompanied by the belief that w¯ was played with probability one, constitutes a sequential
equilibrium. When demand is linear, this sequential equilibrium is unique.
Proof. We first show that the assessment consisting of the JV playing w¯, followed by firms
1 and 2 playing θ˜(w, γ) for any w ∈ Wθ and firm 3 playing θ3(w¯) accompanied by the belief
that γ = w¯ was played with probability one, constitutes a sequential equilibrium of the two
stage joint venture game of imperfect information. To simplify the exposition, let us proceed
with the extensive form transformation of the second simultaneous move stage in which firm
1's move is followed by that of firm 2, which is followed by that of firm 3 and in which
subsequent movers are not made aware of the previous history of the stage. This extensive
form specification requires us to additionally specify beliefs about prior downstream actions
of firms 2 and 3. Let us suppose that in equilibrium, firm 2 believes that firm 1 plays θ˜(w, γ)
with probability one contingent on w having been played in stage one and that firm 3 believes
that firm i = 1, 2 plays θi(w¯) with probability one.
15Existence of θ˜(w, γ) follows from symmetry and Assumptions 1 and 3. Moreover, firm 3's action θ3(γ)
is the same that would prevail in a subgame of the baseline game following w = γ.
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The sequential rationality of the assessment above follows because given γ, firms 1 and 2
select the optimal downstream action θ˜(w, γ) at every information set (choice of w) and from
the proof of Proposition 1, where we showed that the JV optimizes by choosing w¯ when firm
3's action is fixed at θ3(w¯) and that in turn, θ3(w¯) is a best response to θ˜(w¯, w¯) = θi(w¯) =
θj(w¯), i, j = 1, 2, where θ˜(w¯, w¯) = θi(w¯) follows because firm 3 plays θ3(w¯).
Next, let Θ denote the set of downstream actions (P or X as appropriate). In order to
show that the assessment is consistent, we first define the following density functions, each
of which is positive on the interior of their supports: ϕJV :Wθ → [0, 1], ϕ3 : Θ → [0, 1] and
conditional density ϕi : Θ × Wθ → [0, 1], i = 1, 2, which is conditional on w ∈ Wθ, and
where the superscript  represents a positive integer. Further, suppose that lim
→∞
ϕJV (w¯) = 1,
lim
→∞
ϕ3(θ3(w¯)) = 1, and lim
→∞
ϕi(θ˜(w, γ)|w) = 1.
To show consistency, we may now define a sequence of assessments consisting of com-
pletely mixed strategies σ and Bayes' rule derived beliefs µ which converge to the assess-
ment above. For each , define the strategy of the JV as σJV (∅)(w) = ϕJV (w), where the
first set of parenthesis on the left-hand side denotes each player's information set. Like-
wise, define the strategy of firm 1 conditional on w as σ1(w)(θ1) = ϕ

1(θ1|w), the strat-
egy of firm 2 conditional on w as σ2(w × Θ)(θ2) = ϕ2(θ2|w), and the strategy of firm
3 as σ3(Wθ × Θ × Θ)(θ3) = ϕ3(θ3). Proceeding according to the extensive form trans-
formation above, for each , we may define the beliefs of firm 1 as µ1(w)(w) = ϕ

JV (w),
the beliefs of firm 2 as µ2(w × Θ)(w, θ1) = ϕJV (w)ϕ1(θ1|w), and the beliefs of firm 3 as
µ3(Wθ × Θ× Θ)(w, θ1, θ2) = ϕJV (w)ϕ1(θ1|w)ϕ2(θ2|w).16 It becomes immediately apparent
that the sequence of strategies and beliefs converges to the assessment above and that for
each , beliefs are defined from strategies according to Bayes' rule, such that the assessment
is indeed consistent.
16Note that beliefs for firm 1 are stated redundantly. Moreover, the second set of parenthesis on beliefs
refers to all relevant actions. For instance, µ3 specifies firm 3's belief that w, θ1, and θ2 will be played.
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Next, suppose that demand is linear and consider downstream competition in prices
(again normalizing marginal cost to zero). Let γp represent firm 3's belief about wp. Substi-
tuting γp into firms' downstream Bertrand profit functions yields pi(γp), i = 1, 2, 3, where
pi(γp) is defined by replacing wp with γp in Equation (A25). Next, for i 6= j = 1, 2, substitute
hi(p) in Equation (A1) with a− kpi + bpj + bp3(γp) and solve the system of equations that
arises from firm 1 and 2's simultaneous profit maximization problems with respect to down-
stream prices. Substituting the resulting prices for firms 1 and 2 back into Equation (A1)
(as modified in the previous sentence) and maximizing with respect to wp yields:
wp(γp) =
b(4ak2 + b2γpk + b
3γp − ab2)
2(k − b)2(k + b)(2k + b)
Because firm 3's belief must be correct in equilibrium, it must be that γp = wp(γp). This
occurs if and only if
γp =
ab(2k + b)
(k + b)(2k2 − 2bk − b2) = w¯p, (A32)
where the second equality is verified by substituting Equation (A32) into Equations (A1)
and (A25) and by comparing the resulting profits and prices with the rightmost column in
Table 1.1. Any other belief is inconsistent.17 The proof for downstream quantity competition
follows analogously, but using Equations (A2) and (A26) in place of Equations (A1) and
(A25), respectively.
Cost Reduction . In this subsection we present a simple illustration of the role that cost
synergies can play in making a merger at least as profitable as a JV in the Bertrand variant
of our model with linear demand. Thus, suppose that as before, there are no synergies
following a JV, but that post-merger, the merged firm faces marginal cost c− t, where t > 0.
To economize on notation, as in our earlier linear example, we continue to treat prices as
17We note that it is easy to show that Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 are satisfied and the profit function for firm
i = 1, 2 is strictly concave in wp regardless of γp. Moreover, γp drops out of the second derivative of firm i's
profit. Thus, firm 3's belief cannot be a mixture.
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price-cost margins by setting c to zero (so that t can be viewed as increasing the price-cost
margin at any price). Given any value of a, k, and b, we can solve for the value of t that
equates 2pii(p(w
∗
p)), i = 1, 2 with piM(p
Mp) from Table 1.1, where p
Mp
i is replaced by:
p
Mp
i =
a(2k + b)− 2tk(k − b)
2(2k2 − 2kb− b2) (A33)
and p
Mp
3 is replaced by:
p
Mp
3 =
ak − tb(k − b)
2k2 − 2kb− b2 (A34)
Comparing the price in Equation (A33) with its counterpart in Table 1.1, it can be
observed that the merged firm passes on part of its cost savings to consumers, and thus
continues to price below a JV without synergies. Firm 3 similarly lowers its price compared
to that following a merger without synergies. In Figure 1.1, we set a = 100, k = 1 and
examine the value of t such that 2pii(p(w
∗
p)) = piM(p
Mp) for all values of b ∈ [0, 0.5) (recall
that by assumption, k > 2b).
Figure 1.1: Value of t Such That Firms 1 and 2 are Indifferent Between JV and Merger
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Figure 1 shows that the value of t necessary to set 2pii(p(w
∗
p)) = piM(p
Mp) grows in b. This
is because the more substitutable the products, the more able the JV to soften competition
with firm 3 via w. In other words, the merger needs to have a relatively smaller synergy
advantage to outperform the JV as products become more differentiated.
Asymmetric Ownership. Suppose that instead of splitting the ownership of the JV
equally, firm 1 keeps s1 ∈ (1/2, 1] of the profits and firm 2 keeps s2 = 1 − s1. More-
over, suppose that firm 1 attains full control over w in exchange for a lump sum transfer to
firm 2 that would leave both firms with equal expected profits. Finally, as in the previous
subsection, suppose that firms compete in prices downstream and that demand is linear.
Depending on the timing of the lump sum transfer (or alternatively, the details of the JV
contract), firm 1 may choose to set w to maximize its own profit, or alternatively, the joint
profit of both JV partners. With this decision aside, the approach to solve for equilibrium
prices, quantities, and profits follows the same approach as that used in Equations (A25)
through Equations (A27). However, the resulting equations are highly unwieldy due to the
presence of asymmetry. As such, for concision below, we set a = 100 and k = 1 and graph
the relevant profits and prices while discussing the underlying intuition.18
Suppose that firm 1 sets w to maximize joint profits. Figure 2 displays the difference
between merger profits piM(p
Mp) and the sum of JV partner profits pi1(p(w
∗
p)) + pi2(p(w
∗
p))
across all values of b ∈ [0, 0.5) and s1 ∈ (1/2, 1]. The opaque reddish region represents the
part of the parameter space where the JV outperforms the merger. As the graph shows,
a symmetric JV always outperforms the merger, but this becomes less likely as the owner-
ship shares become more asymmetric. Moreover, the JV is more likely to outperform the
merger for higher values of b. As mentioned above, this is because as products become more
substitutable (b increases), the JV is better able to soften competition with firm 3.
18Mathematica programs underlying the results are available upon request from the authors.
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Figure 1.2: piM(p
Mp)− pi1(p(w∗p))− pi2(p(w∗p)) for b ∈ [0, 0.5) and s1 ∈ (1/2, 1]
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The intuition is as follows: Because of its higher ownership, as s1 rises, firm 1 is induced
to lower its downstream price (and w) relative to the symmetric case to raise demand for the
input. Due to its lower ownership, firm 2 is induced to focus more on downstream profit and
possibly to raise its downstream price, though the extent of that increase is constrained by
firm 1's lower price (as is the price of firm 3). The culmination of this incentive misalignment
can lead to lower average prices than following a symmetric JV and can result in lower
cumulative profits than following a merger. We illustrate the effect of asymmetry on prices
for b = 1/4 in Figures 3 and 4 below (3D graphs for b ∈ [0, 0.5) are available upon request).
Figure 1.3: p1(w
∗
p) and p2(w
∗
p) for a = 100, k = 1, and b = 1/4 for s1 ∈ (1/2, 1]
Observe that p1(w
∗
p), p3(w
∗
p), and w are decreasing as the ownership of the JV becomes
more asymmetric. However, whereas p2(w
∗
p) increases at first, there is a threshold at which
firm 2's incentive to raise its downstream price in response to its lowered JV ownership due
to an increase in s1 is outweighed by decreases in the remaining downstream prices and the
input price.
Next, suppose that firm 1 sets w to maximize own profit only. Looking at Figure 5,
which represents a counterpart to Figure 2, when firm 1 sets the input price without regard
to firm 2's profit, it should not be surprising that the size of the parameter space in which the
JV outperforms the merger is now smaller. As before, a symmetric JV always outperforms
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Figure 1.4: p3(w
∗
p) and w for a = 100, k = 1, and b = 1/4 for s1 ∈ (1/2, 1]
the merger (this is difficult to visualize using Figure 5, but has already been proven in
Proposition 4), but is less likely to do so as the ownership shares become more asymmetric
and as b declines.
However, the direction of prices is different in this case. In particular, because firm 1 is
no longer concerned about the impact of w on its partner's profit (except via the lump sum
transfer), depending on the value of b, it may choose to raise w relative to the symmetric
case to exploit its JV partner. This can lead all prices to rise as s1 increases, though we
note that firm 1's price is non-monotonic in s1, and depending on the value of b, may end
up above or below what it would be under symmetric ownership.19
A look at the curves that move along the s1 axis in Figures 2 and 5 suggests that as
s1 goes from 1/2 to 1, piM(p
Mp) − pi1(p(w∗p)) − pi2(p(w∗p)) increases. In other words, in the
case of linear demand, it appears that the advantage that a JV has over a merger dissipates
as the JV ownership becomes more asymmetric. This suggests that were the ownership of
the JV an endogenous decision at the outset of our game, firms would prefer to organize by
setting s1 = 1/2, as in our baseline model.
19Additional graphs that display the relationships discussed in this paragraph are available upon request.
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Figure 1.5: piM(p
Mp)− pi1(p(w∗p))− pi2(p(w∗p)) for b ∈ [0, 0.5) and s1 ∈ (1/2, 1]
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Chapter 2
Hypermarts and Gas Stations
This chapter was coauthored with Jed Brewer and Joseph Cullen
2.1 Introduction
Since the last decade of the 20th century we have seen the emergence of big-box retailers,
discount stores, supermarkets, and mass-merchandisers. These large retailers have exploited
economies of scale and scope in an effort to provide consumers with low prices and the
convenience of one-stop-shopping. At times, the emergence of these retailers has been con-
troversial. Wal-Mart is perhaps the most notable example of these types of stores, the
escalating trend of industry concentration, and the controversy that may surround it.
Hausman and Leibtag (2005) examined the increased compensating variation that has arisen
from Wal-Mart's expansion and find it to be sufficiently large that they conclude that the
entry of Wal-Mart into a local market likely generates a substantial overall benefit to con-
sumers1. Despite their findings, a negative perception of the company remains among some
members of society. Labor unions and competitors often protest proposed Wal-Mart entries,
1Hausman and Leibtag (2005) studied the entry of Wal-Mart Supercenters. Wal-Mart Supercenters sell
a vast assortment of groceries as well as the typical retail products associated with the discount retailer.
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and local officials in some areas have sought to deter its entry through zoning restrictions
and other legislative roadblocks.
A major reason that Wal-Mart's success has been controversial is Wal-Mart's entry into an
area has tended to push traditional retailers, such as popular and nostalgic Mom-and-Pop
stores, out of the market and into bankruptcy. Jia (2008) finds that the entrance of Wal-Mart
alone explains 37 percent to 55 percent of the net change in the number of small retailers in
medium-sized counties from the late 1980's to the late '90's.
Like the Mom-and-Pop stores throughout the country, gasoline retailers are now feeling the
pressures of competition with Wal-Mart and other large stores. Only a decade ago, most
gasoline was sold in a convenience store setting, such as a Chevron station or Shell sta-
tion. Today, however, non-traditional, high-volume retailers like Wal-Mart have added a
new product line: gasoline. These large stores offer low prices, but few of the amenities that
are typically associated with more traditional gas stations/convenience stores. Common
examples of these low pricing, high-volume gasoline retailers, in addition to Wal-Mart, are
Costco, Sam's Club, Safeway, and Kroger. Discount, big-box, or grocery stores selling gaso-
line have been termed in the retail gasoline industry as 'hypermarts'. Hypermarts attempt
to use gasoline sales as a mechanism to generate traffic into their store and subsequently
increase store revenue.
As happened with Mom-and-Pop stores when Wal-Mart entered their markets, several gaso-
line industry players fear that the traditional gasoline retailer can no longer compete. Many
retail gasoline station owners claim that their margins are being squeezed due to the low
gasoline prices offered by hypermarts. Some in the industry are concerned that there will be
a radical reshaping of the retail channels; one in which hypermarts command the majority
of the market share and traditional retailers are left with a relatively small number of con-
sumers who demand the convenience and setting of the gas station as we now know it.
The intent of this paper is to complement the expanding literature on big-box stores, such
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as Wal-Mart2, by quantifying the price impact of these discount stores on smaller competi-
tors. In this market, we are able to measure the price impact of big-box stores on gasoline
retailers who sell a relatively homogeneous good as their primary product and, therefore,
we can avoid the complications of creating representative bundles of goods3. Since gasoline
sales are the primary source of revenue for firms in my dataset4 and since gasoline is largely
the same across firms, we can achieve relatively clean identification of the magnitude of the
price impact big-box stores have on their smaller competitors. Furthermore, since gasoline
retailers operate in very localized markets, we can analyze the geographic extent of a big-box
store's impact in relation to the extent of smaller retailers' impact on each other.
We develop a spatial competition model with two markets and we compare the effects of
the entry of a big box store on the retail gasoline market to the scenario in which all gas
stations are independent. The hypermart has an intrinsic spillover in its profit function
between gasoline sales and in-store sales. If the spillover is sufficiently large, it is optimal
for the hypermart to choose lower prices than other gas stations. When lowering its price of
gasoline, the hypermart not only increases its market share of gasoline sales, it also increases
its market share of in-store sales from costumers looking to minimize the cost (price and
time) of their shopping. In essence, by lowering its price of gas, the hypermart trades profits
at the gas station for more profits elsewhere in the store. Traditional gasoline retailers do
not have this same spillover and thus are at a competitive disadvantage5.
2Stone (1995) was the first to examine the impact of Wal-Mart on traditional retailers. He has been
followed by Basker (2005a); Basker (2005b); Holmes (2008); Neumark, Zhang, and Ciccarella (2008); and
Zhu and Singh (2009); in addition to the papers noted above.
3For example, Basker (2005b) examined the price impact of Wal-Mart's entry on 10 products, such as
aspirin, cigarettes, shampoo, and toothpaste.
4According to FRMC, Inc., gasoline sales account for approximately 70 percent of a typical gas station's
total sales
5Most gas stations do have convenience stores attached. However, it is likely that the dollar size of
the spillover between a gas station and its convenience store is substantially less than for a hypermart's
gas station and its in-store sales. As suggestive evidence, gasoline sales account for about 70 percent of a
traditional gasoline retailer's total sales. On the other hand, gas accounts for less than 5-10 percent of total
sales for hypermarts.
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The paper then uses a unique, comprehensive datasets from Tucson, AZ. We examine the
cross-sectional impact of hypermarts on competitors' prices. We find that hypermarts do
in fact place statistically and economically significant downward pressure on the prices of
nearby gas stations. The results show that if a gas station is located within 1.5 miles of
a hypermart, its price is depressed by about 1.25 cents, all else equal. If this gas station
is located within 0.5 miles from the hypermart, its price is reduced about 2.1 cents. From
industry data on firm profitability, we conclude that a price reduction of this magnitude
would cut an average gas station's profit between 50 to 75%, depending on the distance to
the hypermart.
Overall, given the magnitude of the price impact, it appears that the fears of some traditional
retailers, like Mom-and-Pop stores before, are being realized. The impact of big-box stores,
discount stores, and mass-merchandisers on smaller competitors is remarkable.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: In section 2, we develop a spatial competition
model where we compare the effect of a hypermart on prices to the case of independent
ownership. In section 3 we describe the general aspects of the gasoline market in the United
States. In section 4, we analyze and estimate the model for Tucson's market. In section 5
we discuss the economic significance of the presence of hypermarts in this type of market.
2.2 Model
Consider a city shaped as circle of length 1, where consumers and firms are located. Two
different goods are sold, groceries (good s, sold by firms {Si}{1,...,n}) and gas (good g, sold
by firms {Gj}{1,...,m}). We assume that S1 is located at the start of the circle (that is, either
at 0 or 1) and we denote σ = (σ1, ..., σn) and γ = (γ1, ..., γn) to be the vectors of locations
for types S and G, respectively.
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The demand is given by a unit measure of consumers distributed under a function f around
the circle. Each individual consumer will demand only good S with probability qS , only
good G with probability qG , and both goods with probability 1 − qS − qG6. Since there is
an infinite number of consumers, these probabilities represent the fraction of each type of
demand. There is no outside option and we assume these fractions are fixed, independently
of the prices. This might not hold for many types of goods since consumers usually have a
reservation price such that they can choose not to buy them. In this case, since we are trying
to apply the model to the market of gas and groceries, these are goods that most consumers
cannot substitute, because they have to eat and commute, unless the commuting services
are an available outside option. If consumers had a reservation utility to decide whether to
consume at all, those that are farther from the sellers would be the ones deciding not to
purchase gas or groceries. Gas is not a perfectly inelastic good since car users can avoid
unnecessary driving, but its consumption is relatively stable for small variations of price.
Endogenizing demands as a function of price would add unnecessary structure to a model
whose solution cannot be obtained for a general case and numerical examples with static
demands could be computationally cumbersome in some scenarios.
Even though our later estimations focus only on the market of gas, since the pricing strategy
of a hypermart involves all the markets where they compete, a model illustrating the effect of
an entry of these Big-Box stores in the supply of gas at retail level should take into account
the double nature of this spatial competition, and the increase in demand from consumers
who are willing economize by buying both goods in a single stop.
We assume that for each good, consumers have a demand that is binary (0 or 1). For a
consumer at location k demanding only good x from a firm of type X ∈ {S,G} she will pick
a store such that
6We assume that both qS , qG are fixed and independent on relative prices. A more complex model would
endogenize them as some one stop consumers might become two stop consumers as they would try to preempt
future unplanned purchases by buying gas from H
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min
Xi∈X
Ck (pXi , dXi,k) = −pXi − 2c (dXi,k)
Where pXi is the price set by firm Xi and c (dXi,k) is the cost to move from k to Xi,
which is increasing on the distance dXi,k. If the consumer demands both goods, her problem
becomes
min
Si∈S,Gj∈G
Ck
(
pSi , pGj , dSi,k, dGi,k
)
= −(pSi + pGj)−
(
c (dSi,k) + c
(
dSi,Gj
)
+ c
(
dGj ,k
))
, which implies choosing the grocery store and the gas station such that her total cost
of shopping is minimized. That is, the multi-good consumer's problem is one of a choice
over a menu of sellers, with each item associated to prices and distances. On the aggregate
level, each firm's demand is two-fold: on one side supplying those consumers who demand
only one-good DxXi(~p, σ, γ) =
∫ kxXi
kxXi
f(k)dk and on the other supplying the demand from
consumers who purchase both goods DxyXi(~p, σ, γ) =
∫ kxyXi
kxyXi
f(k)dk. From the consumer's
decision equation above, it is easy to see that both demands are increasing in the same
type neighbors' prices, since it will move the indifferent consumer. On the other side, the
other type's prices affect the demand in a more complex way. For example, take firm Gj,
located between firms Sj and Sj+1, with no other gas station located closer to any of those
groceries store. If Gj is relatively equidistant to both suppliers of good s, D
GS
Gj
(~p, σ, γ)
would be independent to the relation between pSj and pSj+1 since consumers between
groceries store can switch where to buy good s but that decision won't change the distance
traveled to Gj. But as this firm is located closer to a grocery store (suppose without
loss of generality that dSj ,Gj is very small), multi-product consumers in the neighboring
area in the circle would find more appealing to bundle on those two firms (that is, either
(Sj, Gj) or the alternative option available. In this case, we can observe complementarity
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between close neighbors (
∂DGSGj
(~p,σ,γ)
∂pSj
< 0) and substitutability with the ones farther away(
∂DGSGj
(~p,σ,γ)
∂pSj−1
,
∂DGSGj
(~p,σ,γ)
∂pSj+1
> 0
)
.
The difference between gas and regular shopping is that a significant part of their demand
come from unplanned purchases and that is why gas stations tend to locate in high traffic
areas. While this applies to any type of good, it is specially true for gas as part of their
costumers are simply commuters who put gas in their vehicles while traveling. Therefore
we will add an extra component to the demand for gas:
DGi(~p, σ, γ) = qGD
G
Gi
(~p, σ, γ) + (1− qS − qG)DGSGi (~p, σ, γ) +DTGi(pGi)
Where DTGi is the premium in unplanned purchases due to location. This effect will be
stronger on retailers than for pumps located close to the hypermart as the formers pick the
location of their pumps where they can sell more gas7. For simplicity, will assume that all the
demand for shopping goods is planned: DSi(~p, σ, γ) = qSD
S
Si
(~p, σ, γ)+(1−qS−qG)DSGSi (~p, σ, γ)
Thus, for firms Si, Gj their maximization problem becomes:

max
pSi
piSi(~p, σ, γ) = pSiDSi(~p, σ, γ)
max
pGj
piGi(~p, σ, γ) = pGjDGi(~p, σ, γ)
This is a problem of m + n equations and m + n prices. We denote the solution as
7We will assume that a gas station located in the same place as the hypermart doesn't get this premium,
as this location was chosen initially because of its conditions to attract grocery shoppers and later included
its own gas station. Although these hypermarts do get costumers whose demand is unplanned, we will
assume that this DT is only added to retail gas stations, whose location were picked with the sole purpose
to maximize their profits in selling gas.
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~pC =
(
pCS1 , ..., p
C
Sn
, pCG1 , ..., p
C
Gm
)
2.2.1 Commeth the Hypermart
Suppose that firm S1 starts selling good g in addition to good s at the same location (we will
denote this multi-product firm as H hereafter). There are two ways to represent this using
the environment described above. Either the number of firms selling g increase to (m+1), or
one of the retail gas stations is replaced by the gas pumps at the hypermart. Since the goal
of the paper is to measure the effect on the price of other firms of a hypermart selling gas as
opposed to an independent gas station doing it in the same location, we will opt for the later
representation. Then, we will assume that σ1 = γ1 = 0, and that the entry of a hypermart
only implies consolidation in ownership of both firms located at the origin. Then, firm H's
maximization problem becomes
max
pSH ,pGH
pSHDSH (~p, σ, γ) + pGHDGH (~p, σ, γ)
We will assume that 0 is an good location to sell groceries but not necessarily an optimal
one to sell gas, so the Hypermart has no extra demand from unplanned purchases like the
'Mom-and-Pop gas stations. The first order conditions for firm H's maximization problem
are:

(
qSD
S
SH
+ (1− qS − qG)DSGSH
)
+ pSH qS
∂DSSH
∂pSH
+ pGH qG
∂DGGH
∂pSH
+
(
pSH + pGH
)
(1− qS − qG)
∂DSGGH
∂pSH
= 0
(
qGD
G
GH
+ (1− qS − qG)DSGGH
)
+ pSH qS
∂DSSH
∂pGH
+ pGH qG
∂DGGH
∂pGH
+
(
pSH + pGH
)
(1− qS − qG)
∂DSGGH
∂pGH
= 0
If firms S1, G1 were independent, their profit functions would be as the ones described
before, that gives the following first order conditions:
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
(
qSD
S
S1
+ (1− qS − qG)DSGS1
)
+ pS1
(
qS
∂DSS1
∂pS1
+ (1− qS − qG)∂D
SG
S1
∂pS1
)
= 0
qGD
G
G0
+ (1− qS − qG)DSGG0 + pG0
(
qG
∂DGG0
∂pG0
+ (1− qS − qG)∂D
SG
G0
∂pG0
)
= 0
If we compare both scenarios, they differ in pGH
(
qG
∂DGH
∂pSH
+ (1− qS − qG)∂D
SG
H
∂pSH
)
and
pSH
(
qS
∂DSH
∂pGH
+ (1− qS − qG)∂D
SG
H
∂pGH
)
, which are non-positive since
∂DSH
∂pGH
,
∂DGH
∂pSH
are equal
to zero (since being a one-good or two-good consumer is not a choice) and the other
components depend on the spillover effect on multi-good shoppers. Then, given that the
array of competing sellers' locations is the same in both cases (which means that their best
response functions are unchanged), this will induce to lower prices for firm H compared to
the case in which sellers are independent, and therefore, it would result in an equilibrium
with lower prices. This is because of the spillovers on the demand of the other good by
multi-product consumers. That is, as the hypermart decrease the price of one of the goods,
not only the demand for that good will increase, but the demand for the other would do
the same as some two-good consumers would find more appealing to do their shopping in
that location. The the marginal profit will reach zero at a lower price than on the baseline
scenario since its curve should be at least as high as the one with independent firms for all
values of pGH .
Notice that the effects on prices and profits from the multi-product seller should be lower
for firms that are more distant from the origin. Firms compete directly only with their
immediate neighbors. As the hypermart is formed, if the cross effects of multi-product
demand is non-zero, it will set prices lower than if both sellers were independent (without
spillovers, both equilibria should be the same). Its closest neighbors in each market will
respond by lowering its price but observing its other neighbor's price that is still higher and
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the effect on the unplanned demand. This reaction will depend on the relative price drop as
well as the effect of the other good's price on its demand. But as we move away from the
origin, all the distortions would come as a reaction from the original change, and since the
neighboring groceries stores and gas stations don't coordinate their prices to gain market
share, the hypermart's distortion would dissipate with distance8.
Solving a closed form solution for the general problem proved to be intractable, even
when we simplify and parameterize most of the variables and we set the firms in a symmetric
way around the circle. Nevertheless, the results observed in the data can be observed
for most values in the setups arranged in the examples below. Consumers with planned
demand will have a uniform distribution over the circle. From now on, we will assume that
transportation cost is quadratic on the distance, c (dX,k) = (dX,k)
2. The same type of results
would hold under any strictly increasing transportation costs, but given that consumers are
distributed uniformly in the circle, this specific form would give us linear demands on prices
for firms and closed form solutions for the model. Firms will be arrayed in equidistant
locations (a Nash Equilibrium of the location's game). Finally, the additional demand for
the retail gas stations will be given by the expression DTGi(pGi) = PGiz(A − PGi), where z
denotes the importance of this type of demand over the total.
8Nevertheless, this doesn't mean that necessarily we should always observe that PGL would be smaller
than its immediate neighbors. In the simulations below, we could see that when qS/qG approaches to 0,
almost all the demand of the hypermart for groceries come from multi-product shoppers and therefore most
of the price reduction strategies come from good observing that PGL > PG2 in equilibrium. But this is an
unrealistic scenario since it would mean that consumers demanding only groceries are a negligible part of
the population.
A monotonic relation can always be observed when retail sellers are homogeneous (symmetric distance intra
and inter markets). In example 2, some gas stations are located close to a grocery store while some others
are not. This will eventually lead to different effects in both types but the monotonicity would be preserved
among firms with similar characteristics
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Figure 2.1: Distribution in example 1
2.2.2 Example 1
Suppose that there are six firms of each type and each firm is located so close to a firm
selling the other good that for any multi-product consumer would be too costly to purchase
one good in one location and buy the other in any other firm that is not the closest to her,
as in figure 1. That is, multi-good consumers face the options (S1, G1),..., (S6, G6). It would
be too costly for them to buy each good from different parts of the city. This is an extreme
case where all gas stations have a positive demand from mulit-good shoppers and their loss
of demand from having their relative price too high compared to the hypermart is partially
covered from the impossibility for some consumers to buy gas elsewhere if they are already
shopping at their closest grocery store.
We simplify the game making each pair of firms Si, Gi to be located at the same distance
from the origin, but each other separated by a distance , which represents the extra
traveling cost of not having both goods in the same location. When  is negligible and there
is no extra sales from unplanned purchases, the only difference between the firms at the
origin and the rest is the joint ownership at the origin. We can observe that all gas stations
depend greatly on price set by the corresponding grocery store. That is, for firm Gi if any
of the neighbors Si−1, Si+1 lower their prices, its demand would decrease since multi-good
shoppers would find less attractive to shop both goods in that location and would move to
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Figure 2.2: Effects of hypermart in Example 1
the location that had lower relative prices for the bundle. Figure 2 shows the relation of qG
with the other relevant variables of the model. On each row we move qS, z and  with qG
respectively, while the other variables are fixed at their respective middle level.
Figure 2 shows the resulting equilibrium when the hypermart is selling both goods. It
shows that for all the range of values of the parameters, we observe that pGH is lower than
its competitors, and this difference decrease the farther these firms are from the origin
(in each graph of the third column, we see three layers with a monotone relation. The
one below corresponds to the closest firms to the hypermart. The other two preserve that
monotonic relation on distance9). We also observe that the price of gas for the hypermart
would decrease the bigger the size of multi-good shoppers.
9Note that in each of those graphics we observe only three surfaces when there are five firms. This is
because firms are symmetrically located around the circle, which means that pG2 = pG6 and pG3 = pG5
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Figure 2.3: Effects of hypermart in Example 1
With respect to the expected values, the only exception is the market share for gas, where
for values of z large enough, the hypermart's share is below 1/n. This is due to the weight
of the bonus demand due to location that retail gas stations have. Even though these
unplanned purchases account for a large portion of their sales, in this case it only represents
the additional gallons sold by these retailers due to better location for selling gas. For low
values of z, the hypermart sells more gallons than its competitors, but for a relative small
margin. Since the model doesn't endogenize z, qS or qG as a function of the relative prices,
and the menu of combinations of grocery stores and gas stations that multi-good agents can
access (without an excessive cost) have the smallest possible substitutability between items,
the gains from spillovers between goods is the smallest for the hypermart.
Figure 3 compares two-good hypermart with 'all Mom-and-Pop' stores environment. As
expected, the gains resulting from the hypermart trying to capture the two-good shoppers
will drive all gas selling firms' prices and profits down compared to the initial setup. The
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stronger effect on those firms that are closer to the origin10. In section 4, we will see that
this is the same effect observed in the data. However, since we don't include a cost function
to this model, we don't see a change in profits as steep as the one in the data. We can also
see that the hypermart increases its market share on both goods. The fourth column shows
how firm H gained market share of good S compared to S1. Then, if the goal of the Big Box
store is to increase the number of shoppers to their grocery store, competing in the retail
gas market, would do that job.
2.2.3 Example 2
Figure 2.4: Example 2
This array has the same number of gas stations but half the number of groceries store. We
assume that firms G2, G4, G6 only compete for the one-good consumers and the unplanned
purchases11, while G3, G5 would have also two-good consumers.
Figure 5 shows two main differences with the previous example. First, the price of gas
set by the hypermart decreases with qG. This is expected since a higher qG would lead to
higher competition on a bigger size of the total demand. On the contrary, in the previous
10Note that given the symmetry of the circle, we don't need to include all the firms in these results
11This is an oversimplification from the original model since the quadratic function for the cost would
make a multi-stop trip more desirable than buying everything on the same location, even when the total
distance is larger.
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Figure 2.5: Effects of hypermart in Example 2
example, the same effect on qG would decrease the profit from lowering the price coming
from multi-product shoppers. The other difference is that, although all retailers sell gas at
a higher price than the hypermart, PG4 < PG3 . But this is due to firm G3's demand from
multi-product shoppers. That is, a portion of its demand is not as elastic as the one for
one-good consumers, and therefore, its reaction to the hypermarts' low price is not going
to be as steep as for the isolated retailers. Nevertheless we are still observing that among
homogeneous firms G2, G4, the price would still decrease more with closeness to the origin.
Additionally, in this new environment we can observe that unless in extreme circumstances,
the share of the hypermart on good g would be much higher than 1/612 since some gas
stations don't supply multi-product shoppers.
When comparing how this scenario would change if both divisions at the hypermart had
separate ownership (Figure 6), we can see that the effect is larger on those gas stations that
have a grocery store in the same location. The rest of the graphics look very similar to the
ones in example 1.
12that is, either when the demand coming from additional unplanned costumers is too high or when the
proportion of two-good costumers is too low
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Figure 2.6: Effects of hypermart in Example 2
2.3 Industry Overview
Hypermarts currently have a substantial and increasing presence in the retail gasoline
industry. There is also plenty of evidence, both quantitative and narrative, that hypermarts
find it profitable to sell gasoline for prices lower than the prices at traditional gas stations
and, therefore, it is likely that hypermarts will have a substantial long-run impact within
the retail gasoline industry.
Table 2.1: US Gasoline Retailers Declining, Hypermarts Increasing
Total # of Gasoline Retailers # of Traditional Retailers 3 # Hypermarts
2000 175,941 174,801 1,140
2002 170,016 167,582 2,434
2005 168,987 165,469 3,518
2006 167,476 163,423 4,053
Source: Total Number of Gasoline Retailers: National Petroleum News.13
Number of Hypermarts: EAI, Inc.
13Estimating the number of gasoline retailers can be difficult. The National Petroleum News estimate
includes all outlets that sold gas to the public. This includes very low-volume retailers such as marinas.
According to the National Association of Convenience Stores (NACS) there were approximately 112,000
convenience stores selling gasoline in 2006. A convenience store is more what one typically thinks of when
they think of a gas station. However, there are many 'traditional' gas stations that do not have convenience
stores and thus would not be included in NACS' count.
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Table 2 shows that the retail gasoline industry has been experiencing contraction. In
2000, there were nearly 176,000 outlets selling gasoline in the US. This number has fallen
nearly 5 percent to approximately 167,500 outlets in 2006. Meanwhile, hypermarts have
recently been expanding their operations rapidly. In the year 2000, there were 1,140
hypermarts in the US. In 2002, the number grew 113 percent to 2,434. In 2006, the number
had risen to over 4,000 locations, a total increase of over 250 percent from 2000. The
general trend of industry contraction combined with rapid hypermart entry suggests that
traditional retailers have faced a relatively difficult start to the new millennium. Traditional
retailers experienced a decrease of almost 11,500 stations at the same time hypermarts were
growing.
Each hypermart location sells a large volume relative to traditional gasoline retailers.
In 2006, the typical hypermart location sold over 250 thousand gallons per month.14 In
contrast, average sales of traditional retailers were estimated by the National Association
of Convenience Stores (NACS) to have been only 110 thousand gallons per month. Table
3 breaks out the number of hypermarts by type (i.e. grocery store, discount store, and
mass-merchandiser/club store) and compares the volumes in 2006 at these stores and at
convenience stores, the most common form of traditional retailer. Most hypermarts are
grocery stores, such as Kroger or Safeway. The biggest hypermarts in terms of average
volume sold per station per month are the mass-merchandisers or club stores like Costco and
Sam's Club. Of note, Wal-Mart was responsible for over 1,300 of the hypermarts in 2006
contributing to all three hypermart store types between its Wal-Mart stores, Neighborhood
Markets, and Sam's Clubs. Given that an average hypermart location sells two to three
times the quantity of gasoline as that of a gas station, hypermarts compose a meaningful
percentage of the retail gasoline industry market share even though they are far fewer in
number.
14Estimate according to EAI, Inc.
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Table 2.2: Hypermarts by Store Type: 2006
Store Type Number Mean Gallons Sold/ Store/Month (000's)
Grocery Stores 2,164 197,000
Discount Stores 1,045 238,000
Mass-Merchandisers/Clubs 844 430,000
All Hypermarts 4,053 253,000
Convenience Stores 112,000 108,000
Source: Hypermarts: EAI, Inc.
Convenience Stores: NACS.
Figure 7 illustrates the increasing market share of hypermarts over time. In 1998,
hypermarts were virtually non-existent, accounting for less than 1 percent of industry sales.
By 2002 hypermart market share had risen to 5.8 percent and continued rising to 12.2
percent in 2006. Hypermart market share has increased an average of 1.4 percentage points
per year with the largest increase from 2002 to 2003 when it rose by 1.9 percentage points.
Figure 2.7: Evolution of market share of hypermarts
As the model in Section 2 suggests, hypermarts price lower than traditional gas stations.
Industry studies by EAI, Inc. have found that hypermarts sell gas at prices that are three to
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ten cents less per gallon. This ability to price low is an important benefit because consumers
are shown to be sensitive to price differentials across stations. A consumer survey conducted
by NACS in 2007 indicated that 47 percent of consumers said they would be willing to make
a left-hand turn across a busy street to save 3 cents per gallon; 35 percent said they would
drive five minutes out of their way to save the same amount; 25 percent said they would
drive ten minutes to save 3 cents; and an astonishing 11 percent said they would drive ten
minutes out of their way to save only one penny per gallon.15 While these survey numbers
are imprecise, they suggest that when hypermarts price only a few cents lower than their
competition, they may be able to attract a meaningful percentage of new customers. To
this, we must add the possibility of economizing time by buying groceries and gas at the
same location.
In the years before the hypermarts boom, traditional gasoline retailers have made only
about 1 percent of sales in pretax profit and about $30,000 in pretax profit per station per
year.16 Given both the small profit margins and dollars earned in the industry, significant
downward pressure on gas station prices as a result of hypermart presence could noticeably
alter the retail gasoline industry make-up in a similar way the entrance of Wal-Mart altered
the discount retailing industry in the 1980's and '90's.
2.4 Tucson Market
The overall aim of this paper is to analyze the effect of hypermart entry on traditional
gas station prices. An ideal experiment to estimate the impact of big-box, grocery, and
15See NACS 2007 Consumer Fuels Report. NACS followed up the survey to see if people were actually as
price sensitive as they claimed. NACS concluded that people were less sensitive. The survey data suggest
at least that people perceive themselves to be extremely sensitive to differentials in gasoline prices.
16These figures are from FRMC, Inc. a consulting firm to gasoline retailers. FRMC, Inc. maintains a
proprietary dataset covering industry profitability.
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discount stores on retail gasoline competitors would be to collect data on prices for every
gas station in the US and then see how proximity to hypermarts affects price. Of course
this is an infeasible task17. Therefore, we followed the standard procedure in the literature
and collected gasoline data for a city.18
2.4.1 Data
The greater Tucson area has a population of just over 900,000 residents with a geographical
area covering 600 square miles and 29 zip codes.19 A comprehensive dataset of prices,
characteristics, and locations were collected for every gas station in the city's metropolitan
area.20 In 2005, there were 227 gas stations and eight hypermarts for a total of 235
observations.
Generally, the evidence from surveys and industry narratives suggests that hypermarts
price lower than traditional gas stations in order to attract more customers into their store.
Table 3 shows average prices for hypermarts and gas stations in Tucson. The average price
for regular gasoline at a hypermart on March 12, 2005 was $1.97. The average price for
regular gasoline at a traditional gasoline retailer was $2.01. These statistics are consistent
with the EAI study that found most hypermarts price anywhere from three to ten cents
17And it would've required to add more variables to the model since different regions would have different
characteristics and regulations that can affect prices and locations of these gas stations.
18For examples, see Shepard (1993), Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2000) and (2004), and Johnson and
Romeo (2000).
19These estimates were obtained from the US Census Bureau.
20Station prices and characteristics were recorded within a 14 hour period on March 12, 2005. It was
important to gather prices on the same day to account for fluctuations in input prices. If station prices were
gathered over time, it is likely to be the case that station A's price differs from station B's price simply
because they have different marginal costs. It is reasonable to assume that marginal costs are similar for all
stations in a particular city on a given day. It would not, however, be reasonable to assume that marginal
costs are similar for all stations on a given day when the stations are located in different geographical regions.
If the latter is the case, then the researcher would have to control for the regional differentials in marginal
cost. Moreover, taxes would also have to be taken into consideration as they differ across cities and states
as well.
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below traditional gas stations.21 Table 3 also differentiates between branded gas stations
and unbranded gas stations. There are 111 branded gas stations with an average price
of regular gas of $2.03 and there are 116 non-branded stations with an average price of
$1.99. These statistics show that hypermarts tend to choose the lowest prices, followed by
non-branded stations and then by branded stations.22
Table 2.3: Mean Price of Regular Gasoline: Tucson, AZ
Mean s.e. 95% C.I. Obs
Hypermarts $1.973 $0.007 $1.957 $1.988 8
All Gas Stations 2.011 0.003 2.005 2.016 227
Branded 2.029 0.005 2.020 2.038 111
Non-Branded 1.993 0.002 1.988 1.998 116
21Hypermarts often discount gasoline prices for members. For example, a customer who is a member of
Kroger might save 3 cents per gallon off the posted price when he or she swipes his or her membership
card at the pump. For most hypermarts memberships can be obtained free-of-charge by filling out a short,
one-time application. Club stores, like Costco and Sam's Club, however typically restrict gasoline purchases
to members only. For these stores, consumers must purchase annual memberships in order to buy gasoline.
Sometimes club stores will allow non-members to purchase gasoline at a higher price. For example, one
Sam's Club in a dataset from Nashville (not used in this paper) allows non-members to purchase gasoline
for 5 cents more per gallon. When calculating the price of gasoline at hypermarts as in Table 4, we used the
member price since this is the price most consumers pay. We are primarily interested in the effect hypermarts
have on the prices of nearby, competing stations. Using the member or non-member price at hypermarts has
a negligible effect on the coefficients of interest in Section 4.2; differences in member and non-member prices
are largely captured in the hypermart dummy. A new trend for hypermarts (in the last two or three years)
is to tie at-the-pump discounts to in-store sales. For example, a Kroger might give a consumer 10 cents off
per gallon on his or her next fill-up if the consumer spends more than $50 on a single purchase inside the
store. In these instances, discounts are conditional on purchases elsewhere in the store. While common now,
"bundle" discounts were rare in this dataset. I did not include these discounts when calculating the price of
gasoline at hypermarts. However, the emergence of bundle discounts further motivates how hypermarts use
low gasoline prices to encourage consumers to make in-store purchases.
22Branded stations are defined as gas stations associated with a major oil company's brand. Examples
would be Shell stations or Exxon stations. Non-branded or unbranded stations are stations unassociated
with a major oil company. Many non-branded stations operate dozens to hundreds of stations across the
country, while others operate just one. Generally companies operating several non-branded stations are
referred to as 'private-branded'. Examples of large private-brands are Sheetz, Wawa, The Pantry, and Quik
Trip.
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Table 5 breaks-out station prices, lowest to highest, by their respective brands. Arco
prices the lowest of all the brands at $1.97. Interestingly, Arco and Diamond Shamrock
choose similar prices (a few hundredths of a cent lower actually) to the hypermarts according
to their unconditional means.23 Chevron is perceived as a premium brand in the Tucson
market with an average price of $2.07 per gallon. The Other category includes all the
non-branded stations except Circle K. welisted Circle K as itself because it represents over
one-third of all gas stations in Tucson. The non-branded stations generally price higher
than the hypermarts but lower than most of the major oil company brands.
On the whole, gasoline is a relatively homogeneous good. Price differentials exist across sta-
tions in part due to differences in perceived quality and brand loyalty. Another main reason
why price differentials are observed is that gasoline stations are spatially differentiated. A
spatially differentiated products model suggests a competitor is forced to respond to the
presence of competition, such as a hypermart, by reducing its price. A testable implication
is that a station's price should be lower when there are more competing gas stations around
it. Thus, to capture the price pressure placed on a station by a hypermart, it is important
to control for the presence of other traditional retailers in order to disentangle the two
confounding effects.
A common way in the literature to capture the effect of competition from nearby gas
stations is to count the number of gas stations within a pre-specified Euclidean radius of a
particular station (see Barron, Taylor, and Umbeck (2000), (2004)). This may not be the
23It should be stated that Arco is a unique brand. Its corporate office has made it an explicit objective
to have the lowest price. The major reason they are able to achieve this objective is that the majority of
their stations do not allow the use of credit cards at their pumps. Of the eleven Arco stations in the Tucson
dataset, only one permits the use of credit cards.
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Table 2.4: Mean Price of Regular Gasoline by Brand: Tucson, AZ
Mean s.e. 95% C.I. Obs
Arco $1.969 $0.003 $1.961 $1.977 11
Diamond Shamrock 1.971 0.001 1.968 1.975 14
Hypermarts 1.973 0.007 1.957 1.988 8
Conoco 1.983 0.008 1.964 2.001 11
Other 1.993 0.005 1.982 2.004 33
Circle K 1.993 0.003 1.988 1.999 83
Citgo 2.030 0.000 2.030 2.030 6
76 2.030 0.012 2.001 2.058 7
Exxon 2.043 0.010 2.021 2.067 8
Mobil 2.043 0.003 2.036 2.051 13
Shell 2.060 0.010 2.040 2.084 10
Texaco 2.060 0.009 2.035 2.085 5
Chevron 2.074 0.010 2.054 2.094 26
All Stations 2.009 0.003 2.004 2.016 235
best measure. For one, using a Euclidean radius measure doesn't take waterways, freeways,
or other impediments into account. For example, one gas station may be located on one side
of a river and another gas station may be located on the other side. If the nearest crossing
of the river is two miles away, it is unreasonable to assume that the two stations are heavily
competing even though they are reasonably close in a line-of-sight direction. As a result,
we use road distance24 as a more appropriate measure.25 Proximity to other gas station
competition is defined as the number of gas stations within a pre-specified driving distance
of particular station. For estimation, we separately counted the number of stations within
0.5 of a road mile, the number between 0.5 and 1.5 road miles, and the number between 1.5
and 2.5 road miles.
Next, we counted the number of hypermarts within 0.5 road miles, the number between 0.5
and 1.5 road miles, the number between 1.5 and 2.5 road miles, and the number between
2.5 and 3.5 road miles, of a particular gas station and used these as a measure of proximity
to hypermarts.26 These are the key variables of interest.
24Hastings (2004) also used road distances.
25I was able to collect the specific location of each station. I then used the mapping function on Mapquest
to calculate the distance from each station to every other.
26We limit the distance bands for hypermarts to 3.5 road miles. We experimented with larger bands and
found no significant impact at longer distances. Other researchers tend to find limits on price impacts of
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We use a larger range (up to 3.5 road miles as compared to up to 2.5 miles) when calculating
proximity to hypermarts than when calculating proximity to other gas stations. The reason
for this is two-fold. First, it was reported earlier that the average hypermart sells over two
times the volume of gasoline as does a traditional store. Hence, a hypermart is attracting
a larger customer base. Second, the key business strategy of a hypermart is the bundling
of a large retail store and gasoline. People who frequent hypermarts often are there not
just to buy gas, but also to go to the store. Hypermarts provide customers with the ability
to economize on trips. It is reasonable that a typical person is willing to drive a farther
distance to a supermarket or mass-merchandiser than to a gas station. When faced with
the option of getting gas at a cheaper price and at the same time being able to get some
shopping done, we argue that a typical consumer is going to be more willing to drive an
extra distance.
Table 6 lists the summary statistics of the competition measures and the other control
variables. We would expect to observe the greatest price pressure when two stations are
located very close to one another. On average, there are 0.68 gas stations within one-half of
a road mile of a particular gas station. The largest number of stations found within one-half
road miles of a station is four gas stations, while other stations have zero competitors within
that distance. As we expand the distance band, more competitors are present because each
band has a greater area. The average distance to the nearest gas station is 0.57 road miles.
Turning to hypermarts, there are on average 0.03 hypermarts within one-half road miles
of a given retail location and the average distance to the nearest hypermart is 4.68 road
miles. These statistics show that the majority of gas stations in Tucson are not close to
hypermarts.
In addition to collecting data on locations, nearby competition, and specific brands of
stations, we also collected other station characteristics. Dummy variables were constructed
traditional retailers at 1 to 2 miles.
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if a store had a convenience store, a franchise food establishment,27 a car wash, or a
repair shop. The summary statistics for these variables can also be seen in Table 6. Of
the 235 gasoline outlets in Tucson, 209 had a convenience store, 18 had a franchise food
establishment, 14 had car washes, and 19 had repair shops. The mean number of pumps at
each station was just over eight.
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics of Control Variables: Tucson, AZ (235 Obs.)
Variable Mean s.e. Min Max
# Gas Stations < 0.5 mile 0.68 0.050 0 4
# Gas Stations 0.5− 1.5 miles 3.61 0.159 0 11
# Gas Stations 1.5− 2.5 miles 7.63 0.266 0 17
# Hypermarts < 0.5 mile 0.03 0.011 0 1
# Hypermarts 0.5− 1.5 miles 0.14 0.025 0 2
# Hypermarts 1.5− 2.5 miles 0.32 0.039 0 3
# Hypermarts 2.5− 3.5 miles 0.39 0.040 0 3
Convenience Store 0.89 0.021 0 1
Franchise Food 0.08 0.017 0 1
Car Wash 0.06 0.016 0 1
Repair Shop 0.08 0.018 0 1
# of Pumps 8.26 0.237 2 20
Median Income (thousands of dollars) 35.67 0.805 19.34 78.03
Population Density (thousands of people) 2.61 0.016 0.02 5.38
Traffic Flow (thousands of cars per day) 46.52 1.594 3.1 107.25
Relevant demand side variables were also calculated using data from the US Census
Bureau at the zip code level. Specifically, median income and population density were
taken from the 2000 population census. The assumption is that wealthier and more densely
populated zip codes should have higher prices.28
27Franchise food establishments are gas stations where the station is physically combined with a franchise
store. Common examples of franchise food establishments are Subway, McDonald's, and Dominos Pizza.
Gas stations and franchise foods combine together to take advantage of economies of agglomeration.
28Measuring demand based on zip code characteristics has some drawbacks. Take median income for
example. Suppose a gas station is located near the boundary of a particular zip code. It is likely the case
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One other demand side variable was constructed in an attempt to capture the amount of
driving that is taking place around a station. we calculated the average 24-hour traffic
volume29 of automobiles on the street where each station is located.30 This variable improves
upon using a dummy variable if the station is located on a "major" street as often found in
the literature.31 Furthermore, this variable allows each station to have its own unique traffic
volume. One would expect that a station located on a street with more traffic flow is more
able to sustain higher prices than a station located on a street with low traffic volumes, all
else equal32.
that the neighboring zip code's median income differs meaningfully from the zip code that the gas station
is in. If this is the case, then the zip code measure may not actually represent the true median income of
consumers who visit the station. One way to get around this problem is to choose a pre-specified radius
around a station and then measure the median income of the population within that radius. This approach
has the same drawbacks as mentioned earlier. Often there are rivers, freeways, or other barriers that make
it difficult for a consumer to get to a particular gas station even though the consumer resides within the
specified radius. Hence, the radius technique is not a perfect measure either. To complicate matters, it is
quite often the case that a consumer purchases gasoline on the way to or from work or other destinations. If
the consumer works a long way from his or her house, then the gas station could be in a very different part
of town than where the consumer lives. When this situation applies to a large proportion of the population,
neither the zip code measure nor the radius measure will perform well. However, without the luxury of being
able to observe the specific characteristics of every individual who frequents a particular gas station, certain
simplifications and approximations must be made.
29The data was provided by the Pima County Department of Transportation. Tucson is located in Pima
County.
30If a station was located on a street corner, then the traffic volume for that station is the sum of the
traffic volume on the two perpendicular streets.
31See Eckert and West (2004), Eckert and West (2005a), and Eckert and West (2005b)
32Besides the data for Tucson, we had a similar sample for the city of Nashville. The number of gas stations
were bigger and the proportion of hypermarts over the total was also larger. It included most variables except
for traffic. The results of the estimation were inconsistent with the economic intuition (a hypermart had
stronger effect on firms between 0.5 and 1.5 road miles than on those closer than 0.5 miles). To test if missing
the traffic variable had an effect on the estimation, we re-run the model for Tucson, omitting that variable
and we observed a similar change in the estimation. A possibility for this is because hypermarts tend to be
located in high traffic areas which also tend to be areas of relatively high prices. The hypermarts serve to
reduce those prices from their otherwise high level. Without the hypermart, prices would be higher than
average. But with the hypermarts prices appear average compared to other prices in the city. Controlling for
traffic flow (high demand) makes the average prices look like the below average prices that they are. Thus,
it is important to control for traffic flow. Perhaps though, this odd non-uniformity is unrelated to omitted
traffic flow data.
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2.4.2 Estimation
With the data we have collected, we estimate the following equation:
PGi = β0 + β1N
G
i + β2N
H
i + β3Ki + β4∆i + β5Γi + ei
,where PGi is the price of regular gasoline at each station, N
G
i is a vector that separately
counts the number of gas stations and, NHi the number of hypermarts within the respective
distance bands of each station,33 Ki is a vector of each station's characteristics, ∆i is a
vector of measures of demand, Γi is a vector of dummy variables indicating the brand for
each station, and ei is a disturbance term
34. Each βj represents a vector of coefficients.
Table 7 displays the results of the regression for Tucson. The first variables listed in the
table are the most important. The coefficient on the number of hypermarts located within
one-half road mile of a station is -0.021 and is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
This means that a station's price is 2.1 cents lower for each hypermart that is located within
one-half mile of it. The average price for a gas station in Tucson is $2.01. Therefore, adding
a hypermart nearby would reduce the average station's price from $2.01 to less than $1.99.
This effect is not only statistically significant but it is economically significant.
33There are three variables in NGi (the number of gas stations within 0.5 road miles; 0.5-1.5 road miles;
1.5-2.5 road miles) and four in NHi (the number of hypermarts within 0.5 road miles; 0.5-1.5 road miles;
1.5-2.5 road miles; and 2.5-3.5 road miles).
34The standard errors have been corrected for arbitrary heteroskedasticity.
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Table 2.6: Regression of Regular Price of Gasoline: Tucson, AZ
Variable Coefficient Robust s.e. t-stat p-value
# Gas Stations < 0.5 mile -0.0039 0.0021 -1.87 0.064
# Gas Stations 0.5− 1.5 miles -0.0015 0.0009 -1.78 0.076
# Gas Stations 1.5− 2.5 miles 0.0007 0.0006 1.04 0.298
# Hypermarts < 0.5 mile -0.0211 0.0082 -2.58 0.011
# Hypermarts 0.5− 1.5 miles -0.0127 0.0063 -2.00 0.047
# Hypermarts 1.5− 2.5 miles -0.0044 0.0041 -1.09 0.279
# Hypermarts 2.5− 3.5 miles -0.0038 0.0041 -0.92 0.361
Arco -0.0237 0.0068 -3.50 0.001
Chevron 0.0748 0.0053 14.12 0.000
Conoco -0.0077 0.0107 -0.72 0.474
Citgo 0.0299 0.0060 4.95 0.000
Diamond Shamrock -0.0201 0.0063 -3.19 0.002
Exxon 0.0479 0.0103 4.66 0.000
Mobil 0.0440 0.0066 6.68 0.000
Shell 0.0642 0.0108 5.93 0.000
76 0.0244 0.0115 2.13 0.035
Texaco 0.0620 0.0093 6.65 0.000
Hypermart -0.0249 0.0105 -2.38 0.018
C-store -0.0046 0.0081 -0.57 0.572
Franchise Food 0.0111 0.0126 0.89 0.377
Car Wash 0.0033 0.0153 0.22 0.827
Repair Shop 0.0160 0.0072 2.22 0.027
ln(# of pumps) -0.0031 0.0055 -0.56 0.575
Median Income 0.0003 0.0003 1.10 0.272
Population Density 0.0029 0.0015 1.95 0.052
Traffic Flow 0.0002 0.0002 1.00 0.178
Constant 1.9831 0.0141 141 0.000
# of Observations 235
F(26,208) 35.64
R-square 0.6402
Root MSE 0.0276
67
What is more, the price impact of a hypermart is larger than that of a traditional
gasoline retailer. The effect of an additional gasoline retailer within one-half mile reduces a
given station's price by 0.4 cents with a p-value of 0.06. We conducted an F-test to see if the
difference between a hypermart's impact on a station's price was different than a traditional
retailer's impact. The difference between the coefficients is statistically significant at the 5
percent level.35
According to Table 7 adding a hypermart between 0.5 and 1.5 road miles of a gas station
reduces that gas station's price by 1.2 cents, all else equal. In contrast, adding a traditional
gas station in that distance band only decreases a station's price by 0.2 cents. The
coefficients are statistically significantly different at the 7 percent level.36 As one adds a
competitor, whether a hypermart or a traditional gas station, at a distance greater than 1.5
miles from a competitor, the impact becomes statistically insignificant.
The hypermart dummy is also statistically significantly different from zero. The regression
indicates that a hypermart prices 2.5 cents lower than non-branded stations and the
baseline. Even more, the hypermart dummy is more negative than both the Arco dummy
and the Diamond Shamrock dummy, although the effect is not statistically significant.
Earlier we saw that Arco and Diamond Shamrock priced lower than the hypermarts in the
unconditional mean. This finding is weak evidence that, after controlling for differences in
demand and station characteristics, hypermarts price the lowest of all brands and certainly
price lower than most brands in Tucson.37
The regression fits the data reasonably well with an R-square of 0.64. Also, having a repair
35The F-test is a test of linear restrictions. The null hypothesis is that the coefficient on the number of
gasoline stations equals the coefficient on the number of hypermarts. The test statistic is F(1,208) = 3.82
with a corresponding p-value of 0.052.
36The test statistic is F(1,208) = 3.34, with a corresponding p-value of 0.069
37The coefficient on the hypermart dummy is statistically smaller than the coefficients on all other brand
dummies except the Conoco brand dummy
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shop increases a station's price by 1.6 cents and being in a more densely populated area
increases its price. Most station characteristics are not statistically different from zero,
although the signs are reasonable.
2.5 Economic Significance of Hypermart Entry
On the whole, the results presented in this paper suggest that hypermarts decrease the
prices of nearby competition by approximately 2.1 cents. Indeed, price impacts of this
magnitude are economically meaningful to retailers. Data from FRMC, Inc. show that
an average gasoline retail outlet in 2006 sold 1,300,000 gallons of gasoline (about 108,000
gallons per month). On sales of those gallons the typical retail station made $170,500 gross
profit dollars (13.12 cents per gallon), which contributed to $35,000 in total station pretax
profit (0.76 percent of sales). If a hypermart were to open near an average gas station,
the results suggest the station's margin would fall by about 2.1 cents from 13.12 to 11.01
cents per gallon. This in turn would decrease fuel gross profit dollars to $143,130 and total
store pretax profit from $35,000 to $7,630. That is, when being forced to compete with
a hypermart cuts an average station's profit in more than 3/4. And this only takes into
account the effect on prices. The entry of a hypermart will draw a large share of costumers.
Our model in Section 2 shows that those gas stations closer to the hypermart are the ones
who would see a larger drop in their demand. Which means that the overall pretax profit
should decrease more than $7,630, to values closer to the break-even point.
For firms that are at a longer range, between 0.5 and 1.5 road miles from a hypermart, we
found that the price is pushed down by 1.27 cents. This brings the gross profits to $154,000
and the net profits to $18,500, which represents one half of the average value. Even though
the effect is lighter than for gas stations at a closer range, it is significant on the scope, as a
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much larger number of gas stations within these larger radius.
Nevertheless, the data available shows a picture at a certain point of time. In this case, we
can't observe the status of gas stations before these Big-Box stores expanded their sales to
gas. A more comprehensive approach of the effects in the market should include a dynamic
study of the number of traditional gas stations in some radius from a new hypermart. The
data in Section 3 shows a decrease in the number of these traditional gas stations at the
same time that the number of hypermarts grew. It is yet to see if there is a relation between
distance to a new hypermart and probability of leaving the market. Moreover, our data
shows the overall effect for the whole metropolitan area, but one would expect that if the
hypermart entry is the cause for some firms to leave the market, the effect of this entry in
the price of existing gas stations should be higher for new hypermarts than for those that
are already established, where the softer competition should ease the pressure on prices38.
As hypermarts continue to expand and capture more market share many nearby retailers
will be driven to unprofitable conditions, not just marginal ones. If a traditional retailer is
located near two (three) hypermarts, the results show that the downward effect on profit
can doubled (tripled). Being located near two or more hypermarts makes it very difficult
for an average retailer in that situation to remain profitable, even using the lower bound
price impact estimate. Being located near more than one hypermart is not an implausible
scenario. In Tucson 6 percent of all retailers are located within 2 miles of two hypermarts.
These firms must be much more efficient in their operations than the average station or will
have to move to remain solvent. Taken as a whole, price impacts of this magnitude will
place substantial pressure on traditional retailers and will force some to exit the market.
38Our model includes the effect of nearby competition in the variables in NGi
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2.6 Conclusion
The long run trends toward big-box, grocery, discount, and club stores have led to significant
changes in the retail landscape in the United States. A trend since the turn of the century
has been for the large, multi-product stores to begin selling gasoline. Traditional retailers in
the gasoline industry fear that they will face the same declines in their prospects experienced
by Mom-and-Pop stores when Wal-Mart comes to town. Gasoline industry analysts have
maintained that hypermarts price low and thereby force nearby gas stations to respond by
reducing their prices to unprofitably low levels. The rapid growth of hypermarts has caused
trepidation for traditional gasoline owners as many fear they will be unable to compete in a
world where hypermarts command a more substantial portion of industry market share.
In this paper, we examine these trends theoretically and empirically. We develop a model
that shows how the spillover effects from selling gasoline influence the profit maximizing
price for gasoline for the big-box firm relative to the price for a firm selling just gasoline. If
the spillover is sufficiently large, it is profit-maximizing for the hypermart to price its gas
lower than the optimal price for traditional gas stations. This result is especially useful in
explaining why hypermarts price lower than most gas stations in the US. It is also consistent
with the literature that shows certain products can be sold as loss-leaders by multi-product
firms.39
Empirical analysis for the metropolitan area of the city of Tucson, AZ, shows the size of
the impact of hypermarts on pricing in retail gasoline markets. We collected information
on prices and other features from a complete sample of gasoline retailers (235 gas stations).
In both cities we find hypermarts price lower than other stations. In the analysis that takes
into account the geographic spread of markets, we find that as the number of hypermarts
39My model does not require gasoline to be sold below cost. For representative loss leader articles see Hest
and Gerstner (1987); Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003); Nevo and Hatzitaskos (2005); and DeGraba
(2006)
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increases, prices are forced downward for nearby retailers. On average, if a gas station is
located within 0.5 road miles of a hypermart, the station's price is pushed down about 2.1
cents, and if it's located between 0.5 and 1.5 miles, the price is lowered by 1.2 cents. This
effect of a hypermart is substantially greater than the effect of the addition of a traditional
gas station in the areas.
Overall, it is estimated that retailers operate on small net profit margins. Therefore, gas
stations have very little room for their prices to be pushed down any farther. As hypermarts
continue to enter some retailers will be forced to exit the market. This occurrence in the
retail gasoline industry is representative of a larger trend. Societies globally are experiencing
an increase in low priced, one-stop-shopping big-box stores and mass-merchandisers. As
the transformation takes place, some smaller firms are left struggling as they adapt to more
competitive business environments. We have identified the short-run impacts (within the
year) of the introduction of hypermart gasoline stations. Given the large number of big-box
stores, groceries, and discount shopping sites located in prime shopping areas, it seems
likely that hypermarts will continue to expand further into the gasoline industry, creating
more pressures on traditional gasoline retailers to find new ways to cut costs, differentiate
their products, or exit the industry.
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Chapter 3
On the Role of Matching and Social
Norms in Epidemics Dynamics
3.1 Introduction
The study of epidemics has been the focus of numerous works in both social and natural
sciences. While some works try to quantify the extent and intensity of the diffusion of disease,
others look to predict how different variables might affect the extent of contagion. These
models have been useful to describe propagation not only of different types of human, animal
and crop diseases but also computer viruses, human behavior, technology, information, ideas,
etc. While in some models the rate of contagion is unchanged for the duration of the epidemic,
some others require to assess the decision makings at the micro level as a response to changes
in the environment. Examples of this are decisions over vaccination, social distancing, sexual
prophylaxis, abstinence, regular hygiene, burial procedures, etc. These actions will also shape
the progression of the disease as they modify the rate at which it is propagated. That is, the
aggregation of individual best responses to a signal has an impact on future signals observed
by them. Within an epidemics' framework, this decision is between a risky action and a
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costly but protective one, and the choice is made depending on the relative risk between
them.
Some behaviors have payoffs that are dependent on their frequency in the population,
either because they need coordination to avoid costly misunderstandings or because there
is a social cost of behaving oddly. Attitudes towards prevention are not exceptions. This is
specially important in the early stages of the epidemic, when a group of agents whose oppor-
tunity cost of deviating is lower want to break with the norm.1 This peer pressure against
deviation would increase the amount of risk necessary for some agents to play differently
than the rest.
Peer pressure is not the sole component affecting this decision as it is affected by other
factors such as comfort, misunderstanding of the nature of the disease and the monetary
cost of protection that makes riskier actions more desirable for the population.2 The effect
of norms and peer pressure regarding attitude towards risk has been very well documented3
since the outbreak of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s, when the scare of the growing disease led part
of the population to use protection. However, the use of protection is unequal in different
societies, even when the prevailing risk should lead agents to adopt such behavior. These
works found that individuals listed their perceived attitude towards risk of others as a reason
to justify their behaviors. For sex workers, forcing protection could end in loss of clients.
That is, absent these type of rigidities, a more rapid switch to protection would occur, leading
to a lower level of prevalence at the peak of the epidemics.4
Agents in this model will solve an intertemporal maximization problem. They have a
binary choice in each period of a high risk or a low (no) risk action.5 The model used is the
1Hrdy, D., (1987), Manguvo, A., Mafuvadze, B., (2015)
2Jadack RA et al (1997), Maharaj, P. (2006). Though the literature is quite extensive in these matters
3Kelly et al., 1997,Hart & Peterson, 2004), Peterson et al (2008), Miner et al (2009)
4Vanlandingham et al (1995), Pohorila et al (2010), Polk, et al (2011), Matson,et al (2014)
5Although it's not part of the main objective of the paper, this model can be extended to commercial
environments, like immunizing cattle or crops(which has to be done periodically, since the animals are
renewed and new crops are planted every season) or buying a seed that is more resistant to plagues, but it
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Susceptible-Infected (SI), which means that once an agent is infected, it will stay that way
until her death. This was chosen due to the simplicity to isolate the effects. A Susceptible-
Infected-Susceptible (SIS) or Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) models, would add an
extra variable in the time of recovery and an extra type of players, without changing the
main results regarding the decision making process.
In this model, agents will base their decisions on the expected value of each strategy,
given the information available. The effects of norms is addressed in two ways. On one
side, through the availability of partners, denoted by the function ν: the less popular a
strategy is, the less probable an agent would find a partner in that period.6 On the other
hand, ω, measures the effect of peer pressure on the utility, independently of the probability
of interaction. Then, when the norm7 is to play the risky action at the beginning of the
contagion, we will observe that the disease will peak at a higher level than when these peer
effects are absent.
Since the mid 1990s, theoretical literature regarding modeling epidemics, has been study-
ing the problem from two perspectives: autonomous epidemics, on one side, and micro-
founded epidemics,on the other. The first case focuses the analysis on how the epidemic
would spread over certain fixed structures of human relations and how this spread could be
minimized through public policy, either by strategic immunization or by treatment8, but the
rates of contagion are fixed. This work fits on the second group. Among those works that
focus on individual behavior, one branch studies the decision making of individuals regarding
would imply to break with traditions or social bias against certain companies
6It will be assumed throughout the paper that negotiations are between equals and a disagreement would
lead to no interaction. Self-efficacy, bargaining, and power imbalance between gender roles (See Pulerwitz,
J., et al (2002), White et al (2003), Murphy et al (2006), Kerrigan (2007)) won't be treated in the model
7Throughout the paper we will refer to norm as the case when the peer effect functions are active and
the profile of strategies is overwhelmingly on one strategy.
8This literature is quite extensive because since there's no individual strategic interaction, models of
diffusion of ideas and technologies can be used also for epidemics. I found interesting approaches in Pastor-
Satorras and Vespignani (2001, 2002), Jackson and Lopez Pintado (2015), Kleckowski et al (2012), Galeotti
and Rogers (2013).
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their level of social interaction. Kremer (1996), Auld (2003), Reluga (2010), Aadland et al.
(2010), Chen (2011, 2012), analyze the change in the optimal number of partners chosen
by agents to interact with a risky strategy. In this work's model, social distancing is not
part of the agent's choice but a consequence of lack of matching due to choice of unpopular
strategies.
Another line of research focuses on the decision of costly protection to prevent infection.
This prevention can be permanent, like vaccines (Brito et al (1991), Chen (2006b), Chen and
Toxværd (2012), Toxværd (2015, 2016b), or temporary, with the decision being repeated in
each period (Geoffard and Philipson (1996), Chen (2004, 2006a) Goyal and Vigier (2015),
Mathies and Toxværd (2015)). Even though decisions over vaccination are affected by social
norms too, the SI model fits better in the second line of research. This paper's model follows
the same type of logic but, in addition to the indirect effect of the path of play through the
level of prevalence, each strategy's utility depends directly on the behavior of her peers.
Although not in the same way as this work, there's a subset of the literature that includes
the direct effect of other agents' actions in the payoff of strategies. In Schroede and Rojas
(2002), agents are paired with another and they play a multi-staged bargaining game regard-
ing protection. Although the expected outcome depends on other agents' strategies, their
preferences for them is given exclusively by the relative risk. In Bauch (2005), agents have
the option to switch strategies only if they observe another agent playing differently than
them and they are better off switching, and the probability of being exposed would depend
on this alternative strategy's popularity. This direct effect comes through the probability
of learning of better alternatives than from the social costs of acting differently than the
majority.
The closest model to the one study here is the one of Oraby, Thampi and Bauch (2014)
where they reproduce Bauch (2005)'s model but they add what they call injunctive social
norms in the way of a reward proportional to the number of users. As far as I'm concerned,
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this is the only work in which norms are included directly in the utility function. The present
model differs in many ways. In their work, they focus in long term immunization. In this
paper, the social cost comes not only from punishment but also from the possibility of finding
another agent matching strategies. This is important since the strategy played by infected
individuals become relevant to the evolution of the disease.
The concept of equilibrium used throughout the paper is Evolutionary Stable Nash Equi-
librium as the resulting norm in steady state should be robust to small invasions of mutants.
Preferences are heterogeneous and the agents' expected payoffs are dynamic not only because
of the changes in other agents' play, but the evolution of risk over time would change the
relative payoffs of each strategy. This has a double effect on the dynamics. As more agents
adopt low risk strategies, the rate of prevalence would decrease, lowering the relative risk
of unsafe practices. On the other side, gains in popularity of this low risk strategy would
increase the social cost of playing the risky one, countering the effect of lower relative risk.
Moreover, this opens the possibility for multiple equilibria for the same level of prevalence.
Policies aimed at reducing the level of prevalence, then, on one side will require a greater
amount of effort in the initial stages to break these social barriers, but also, given the
presence of multiple attractors, their design should be to equilibrium selection instead of
long term distortions. For example, policies like free distribution of condoms or providing
better information regarding the risk of transmission can be ineffective if the incentives
overlook the effect of social costs from breaking with the norm. But also, this open the
possibilities for policies oriented towards decreasing the cost of opportunity of prevention
by weakening the norm.9 Data has shown that individuals can adopt different behaviors
depending on their perception of the strength of the norm. A weaker norm would reduce
the agents' expected social costs from deviating.
Standard literature on epidemics also assume infected individuals would take risk by
9Albarracin et al (2005)
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default since the threat of contagion is not a factor in their decision making. Data shows
that their behavior is not as such.10 These social costs from playing differently than the
majority can make the infected individuals decision making less trivial as they will have
incentives to play low risk actions even when they don't have anything to prevent for.11
That is, without a need to assume any sort of altruism in regards to passing the disease to
another agent, an infected individual can still do it for selfish reasons to avoid losing social
standing. This will have consequences on the evolution of the disease.
Although in this model it will be assumed that agents learn their health status imme-
diately, an interesting feature of certain diseases like HIV/AIDS is that the latency period
between infection and manifestation is not as such. This uncertainty would lead to formation
of beliefs that would affect the opportunity cost of deviating, when these beliefs turn to be
'fatalistic', as seen in Kerwin (2012) and Greenwood et al (2013). I analyze this case in an
Online Appendix to show that the basic results and structure are unchanged.
The paper continues as follows: in Section 2, I introduce the model and analyze the effect
of peer pressure on equilibria and dynamics. In Section 3, show the effects on the design
of policies. In a separate online Appendix, I extend the model to other possible setups,
including the case of asymptotic latency.
3.2 Model
There is a unit measure of risk neutral agents with a binary choice in each period between a
'risky' (R) and a 'less-risky' (N) strategies. Strategy N is costly and this is represented by
10CDC (2004)
11This is not exactly true since there are multiple STDs, and different mutations within the same disease,
that can increase the negative effect on health, so those individuals infected with a weak one, might want to
prevent from acquiring a stronger one. On this, Geretti, A.M. et al (2009), Poudel et al (2011), Pant Pai et
al (2012).
This model would simulate the effects of only one type of disease. Aadland, Finnoff, Huang (2010) modeled
the case where there are two possible diseases to be infected with.
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a lower payoff u (R) > u (N). Agents types are indexed over the interval [0, 1], increasingly
according to their preferences over R and decreasing over N , that is u1 (R) ≥ ul (R) ≥
u0 (R) > u0 (N) ≥ ul (N) ≥ u1 (N) for l ∈ (0, 1). Preferences are distributed under a
cumulative distribution F , where f (i) denote the density of type i over the total population,
and uR(i)/uN(i) will be distributed between uR(1)/uN(1) and uR(0)/uN(0). To ease the
understanding of the results, we will assume that both extremes have a positive density and
this distribution is discrete, but the results also apply to a continuous pdf.12
As described in the introduction, social norms have a two effects in the utility. On one
side, the one related purely to social standing/punishment among peers (ωAt ). On the other,
the probability of finding another agent matching strategies (νAt ). That is, agents would be
playing the following coordination game:
R N
R ωRt u
i(R) 0
N 0 ωNt u
i(N)
where an individual would find another one playing R with probability νRt and N with
probability νNt .
13 This functions depend on the aggregate actions of other agents.
Definition 1. There are two basic setups in this model:
a) Under the non assortative setup, agents interact with a random agent of the popula-
tion, regardless if their strategies match.
b) Under the assortative setup, agents only interact with another agent with whom they
are successfully matched. Two agents are 'successfully matched' if they coordinate
in one of the Nash Equilibria {R,R} , {N,N}, else there is 'no successful match'.
12In most of our examples, we will use a simple binary distribution with P (0) and P (1) = 1− P (0)
13We will define them properly later. Not necessarily νNt = 1− νRt willhold.
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The nature by which some diseases are transmitted can differ from case to case. Matching
is not required in all of them since, for some types of disease, protection doesn't preclude
agents from interacting with other agents differing in strategy. When this is the case, the
only active social component of the utility will come from ω. Else, the probability of finding
another agent with the same strategy will have a role in the expected outcome.
The value of σi,ht (A) ∈ [0, 1] , which is the probability that the agent, of type i and
health status h, plays strategy A ∈ {N,R} in that period. I will discuss in detail the agents'
problem after introducing the disease, but it's worth to notice that even though agents can
play mixed strategies, the solution will eventually be of the bang-bang type and therefore
they will eventually play pure strategies almost everywhere,14 as the probability of reaching
an outcome under any setup of the model such that the a positive measure of agents would
be indifferent is zero.
There is an infectious disease that can only be transmitted when there is a positive contact
between a health and an infected agent. Agents can be either healthy (H) or infected (I). The
disease is of the Susceptible-Infected (SI) type, which means that once an agent is infected,
there's no cure and remains as such.15 In the first period, each type of agent starts with
a level of prevalence I i0, and the aggregate incidence is I0 =
∫
f (i) I i0di, and based on the
profile of strategies, this variables evolve. In each period agents would leave the system
with a probability δ, that is independent of their health status. A more realistic assumption
would have different death ratios for susceptible and infected agents, but this won't affect
the outcome of this work qualitatively as the value lost in utility due to a shorter life can be
included in the cost of being infected, as it will be shown later.
14In the sense that either an event of indifference has a zero probability of occurrence, or the measure of
agents indifferent is zero
15As it was mentioned in the introduction, not only there are many types of disease but each disease has
mutations that can be more aggressive than others, which means that even infected individuals could have
an incentive to protect regarding their health.
I will assume there's only one disease out there and once an agent is infected, her status can't change
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Let IAt be the proportion of infected agents among those playing A and defined by
IAt =
∫
i
f (i)σi,It (A) I
i
tdi∫
i
f (i)
(
σi,It (A) I
i
t + σ
i,H
t (A) (1− I it)
)
di
The proportion of agents playing A in that period is given by µAt =∫
f (i)
(
σi,It (A) I
i
t + σ
i,H
t (A) (1− I it)
)
di. Even though µRt = 1 − µNt holds in every period,
for clarity in the exposition I will continue using both variables. These, besides affecting
the rate at which the disease spreads, also define the peer effect on the agent's decision,
νAt = ν
(
µAt
) ∈ [µAt , 1] and ωAt = ω (µAt ) ∈ [0, 1],16 which are increasing in µ,17 and equal to
1 when µ = 1.18
Definition 2. Let ν, ω and ν ′, ω′ be functions for two different societies, if ν(µ)ω(µ) first
order stochastically dominates ν ′(µ)ω′(µ), then the social norm is stronger in the former
than in the latter
In this sense, we say that a norm is stronger if the cost of opportunity of choosing an
unpopular strategy is higher. This could come from either lowering their social standing
among their peers for having an 'odd' behavior, or because the fear for social punishment,
the probability of finding another agent matching strategies would be lower, as their behavior
would be concealed from the public. For example, in societies where the prevailing behavior
is R, such that µRt > 0.5, ν
′(µNt )ω
′(µNt )u
i(N) > ν(µNt )ω(µ
N
t )u
i(N).
We define λA to be the probability of being infected by exposure to a carrier of the
16Alternatively, this function can be thought as a reward-punishment function such that ω(µ) ∈ [ω, ω]
such that ω(µ
N )+ω(µR)
2 = 1.
17Note that ν(µ) is constrained to be higher than µ while ω(µ) is not. This is because in this model
we assume that the worse case scenario regarding the probability of matching is just a one shot random
matching with uniform probability distribution. ω is treated differently as it might be the case where acting
outside the norm is highly penalized, for example, ω(µ) = µ2
18We treat ν as independent from history. A more realistic approach in which agents could form longer
term partnerships, should have a dual value such that if a strategy is rare and ν is low for low values of µ,
agents would be willing to form a longer term partnership once they meet someone coordinating strategies,
and that partnership might lose strength as that strategy becomes more popular.
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disease, when playing A, such that λR > λN ≥ 0. It will be assumed in general that the
non-risky strategy offers an efficient method to prevent contagion (λN is low enough), but
not necessarily zero since problems such as self-efficacy or malfunction can arise to impede
this strategy to be a perfect protection.19 I also assume that λA only affects the rate at which
the disease is acquired but not the rate at which is transmitted.20 Let piAt = pi
(
λA, It, I
A
t
)
be the risk of contagion when having a successful match in A.In the case of perfect mixing
the function will depend on It and when assortativity is perfect, on I
A
t .
It will be assumed initially that there's no asymptomatic latency period. That is, once the
agent is infected, she is aware of her health status and this is private information (symptoms
are not observed by other agents). This characteristic will have a dynamic effect on the
distribution of preferences but won't necessarily change the structure of the game. I will
explore this possibility in a separate appendix.
3.2.1 Agents
Agents observe how their peers play in the aggregate and the current level of prevalence
in the population. I will assume they are not aware of the distribution of types in the
population, so the only state variables used are
{
µNt−1, µ
R
t−1, It
}
. Then, they estimate Σ˜t ={
ν˜
(
µNt−1
)
, ν˜
(
µRt−1
)
, ω˜
(
µNt−1
)
, ω˜
(
µRt−1
)
, p˜iN (It) , p˜i
R (It)
}
.21 We are assuming that p˜iAt = λ
AIt,
which is not accurate under perfect assortativity, since the proportion of infected individuals
19If neither strategy can provide enough protection, a third strategy regarding social distancing should be
included in the model as we might have that both risks could reach such a high level that some types would
have negative expected utility on both strategies and would prefer to 'sit out' for the next period. Under the
perfect mixing model, this leads to choosing the 'best of the bad scenarios', and when a matching is needed,
the risk in either strategy could be so high that healthy agent would pick the less popular strategy as a way
of socially distancing.
Therefore, with a rate of transmission low enough we guarantee that the agent's utility will be non-negative
for at least one of the strategies and avoid the need to include the option of sitting out.
20An example of the latter is the case that if an infected player play λN , the rate at which she can pass
the disease to others is lower.
21To simplify notation I will use Σ˜t =
{
ν˜Nt , ν˜
R
t , ω˜
N
t , ω˜
R
t , p˜i
N
t , p˜i
R
t
}
. Note that the first two components
would be irrelevant when there's no assortativity
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playing each strategy would be different. That is, if IAt > It, the real risk λ
AIAt would be
higher than the p˜iAt used above. In Section 3, I will explore the case in which agents can
estimate more accurately the risk of each strategy, I˜At ∈
[
IAt−1, It.
]
. Agents perfectly observe
last period's µ's, but since they have no knowledge of the distribution of preferences, they
are unable to predict the current period's value, making it impossible to predict other agents'
deviation.
There is a cost C when an agent becomes infected. I will assume that C > maxi
(
ui (R)
δ
)
,
so that there's a negative lifetime utility from being infected, even for the highest type in
their best case scenario. Then, the value function of using strategy A is
V i,ht
(
σi,ht , Σ˜t
)
= σi,ht (R)V
i,h
t
(
R, Σ˜t
)
+
(
1− σi,ht (R)
)
V i,ht
(
N, Σ˜t
)
If healthy,
V i,Ht
(
A, Σ˜t
)
= ν˜At
(
ω˜At u
i (A)− (1− δ) p˜iAt C
)
If infected,
V i,It
(
A, Σ˜t
)
= ν˜At ω˜
A
t u
i (A)
The problem for an infected individual is much simpler but nevertheless not trivial, since
it depends on the sign of ν˜Rt ω˜
R
t u
i (R)− ν˜Nt ω˜Nt ui (N). This breaks with the standard literature
on transmission of diseases that assume that someone who becomes infected has no incentive
to switch from the risky strategy. In this case, even without assuming any sort of altruism
in their utility function, they will suffer a loss if they don't play with the crowd. They won't
protect until a considerable fraction of healthy individuals have done it. The decision of
the healthy player is a little more complex as the risk of infection is part of their decision
making.
Once that agents make their choices, we obtain the profile of strategies σ¯t, from which
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we can calculate the true values of µRt , µ
N
t , pi
R
t , pi
N
t , that will determine the ex post payoffs,
new health status for agents and overall levels of prevalence for the next period. This profile
σ¯t would include the action if healthy or infected for each type.
22
The game starts at µR0 = 1,I0 > 0. Although this is a Nash Equilibrium for low values
of I, it is not necessarily unique if, for example, ν(0)ω(0)u1(R) < u1(N).
3.2.2 General Model
First we need to define some characteristics of the functions defining the norms:
Assumption 4. : 1) ν (0) ≥ 0, ν (1) = 1, ν (µAt ) is increasing in µAt and such that
ν
(
µAt
) ∈ [µAt , 1]; and 2) ω (0) = ω ≥ 0, ω (1) = 1, ω (µAt ) is increasing in µAt
Assuming an initial condition of all agents playing R with a small measure of infected is
not enough to guarantee eventual changes in strategies among agents. Lemma 1 defines the
thresholds for the different scenarios in strategies and prevalence level:
Lemma 2. Let µR0 = 1, and 0 < I0 < ε, then
a) if λR <
δ
1− δ , It −→ 0;
b) if
δ
1− δ < λ
R <
u0 (R)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u0 (N)
(1− δ)CI (λR) + ν˜ (0)λ
N , 'All R' remains an equilibrium
with It −→ I > 0;
c) if λR >
u0 (R)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u0 (N)
(1− δ)CI (λR) + ν˜ (0)λ
N , 'All R' can never be a steady state equilib-
rium
22That means, if f is discrete, it will be a vector of size 2n.
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Proof. In the Appendix
This result is straightforward. Given the starting condition of the game, the extent
of the disease would depend on the rate of contagion λR. If it's too low, the epidemic
would die out. If the value is not too high, the disease would be endemic, stabilizing at a
positive level, but not high enough to induce deviation. Finally, once λR reaches a value
high enough, the proportion of infected will increase to a point in which at least one type
of agents will be willing to deviate.
Corollary 1. The maximum level of of prevalence such that no agent would be better off by
deviating, is
I¯ =
(
ui (R)− ν˜Nt ω˜Nt ui (N)
)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜Nt λN)C
Proof. : Using the proof Lemma 1,
(u0 (R)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u0 (N)) = (1− δ) (p˜iRt − ν˜Nt p˜iNt )C
I¯ = It =
ui (R)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)ui (N)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜ (0)λN)C
That is, using the results from Lemma 1, the lowest type of agents will deviate from the
norm once the level of prevalence is higher than I¯all agents will play R until they observe
the level of prevalence reaching I¯. However, it won't be necessary to assume that λR is
higher than the second threshold of Lemma 1 for all the values of ν(0)ω(0). One interesting
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setup would be the one where not considering the effect of norms would lead to a cascade of
changes in behavior while strong norms would predict no deviation at all.23 In the following
proposition we observe that the higher the social cost of playing against the rest of the
agents, the higher will be the levels of prevalence supporting a pooling equilibrium in R. Let
∆i(µR, µN , I) = ν(µR)(ω(µR)ui(R)− (1− δ)λRIC)− ν(µN)(ω(µN)ui(N)− (1− δ)λNIC)
Proposition 6. Let α be such that ν˜(α, µA), ω˜(α, µA) are continuous, differentiable and
increasing in α, and ν˜(1, µA) = 1, ω˜(1, µA) = 1
a) Let I¯ν (α) be the minimum value of I such that ∆i(1, 0, I¯ν(α)) < 0 for at least some type
i. Let λN be low enough such that, λNui (R)−λRω (0)ui (N) < 0 for at least one type,
then dI¯ (α) /dα < 0 and I¯ν (1) < I¯ν (α) < I¯ν (0) for all α ∈ (0, 1)
b) Let I¯ω (α) be the minimum value of I such that ∆i(1, 0, I¯ω(α)) < 0 for at least some type
i. Then, dI¯ω (α) /dα < 0 and I¯ω (1) < I¯ω (α) < I¯ω (0) for all α ∈ (0, 1).
c) ω˜ (0) , ν˜ (0) are strategic complements on I¯
Proof. In the Appendix
This is an important result: the higher the social cost from leaving the norm, the higher
the peak of prevalence before some agents switch. This means that underestimating the
peer effects in the decision making would predict an early deviation and lower highs in the
contagion. Figure 1, shows an example of this, where ω˜A = µA + β(1 − µA) and there's no
assortative matching.24 There is a range of values for I (above 0.07) such that agents would
be willing to play N if there was no expected social punishment. This delay in deviation
23Nevertheless, the dynamics depend strongly on the distribution of preferences, if f(0) = 0, then while
the lowest type will deviate, there won't be any impact on the course of the epidemics.
24This last effect wouldn't change the curves significantly
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will depend on the strength of the norm, and can be of another 15 periods, where I reaches
a value three times higher.
Figure 3.1: Evolution of the epidemic until first deviation for two types. f i = 1/2,
ui(R) = 1− ui(N), u0(R) = 0.6, u1(R) = 0.8, λR = 1/7, λN = 1/28, δ = 1/30
The only assumption we need for the first result of the proposition is that the protection
offered be good enough to compensate for the opportunity cost of switching (λ
N
λR
< ω(0)u
i(N)
ui(R)
).
When λR is low enough, the level of prevalence might not rise above I¯ for strongly normed
populations and no typeof agents would deviate from R, as shown in Figure 2. In this sense,
we will observe later that an effective policy to reduce prevalence when the norm is weak
agents, might have no effect when peer it is strong.
3.2.3 Equilibria
After the first subset of agents deviated from the norm in R, the model can lead to different
types of outcomes: Pooling on N Steady State, Separating Strategies Steady State and
Cycles. Each of these outcomes not only will depend on the relative risk but also on the
settings of the model. These outcomes might not be unique but the system would need an
external shock to achieve these other equilibria.
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Figure 3.2: Same setup as Figure 1 with the difference that λR = 1/15 instead of 1/7
Proposition 7. Let I
(
λN
)
be the steady state prevalence level when all play N , and let
u1 (N) > ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u1 (R), then µN = 1 is a Nash Equilibrium steady state only if
λN <
u1 (N)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u1 (R)
(1− δ)CI (λN) + ν˜ (0)λ
R
Proof. : Let µN = 1. Given the assumption, infected individuals would not have incentives
to deviate. Then, let ∆i,h
(
Σ˜t
)
= V i,ht
(
R, Σ˜t
)
− V i,ht
(
N, Σ˜t
)
be the incetive for an agent
type i and health status h to play R given the state Σ˜t. Then, using the same procedure as
in Lemma 1, ∆i,H
(
Σ˜t
)
< 0 if
λN <
ui (N)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)ui (R)
(1− δ)CI (λN) + ν˜ (0)λ
R
For which the threshold is lower for the highest type.
Note that, again, the threshold is sensitive to the effect of ν˜ (0) , ω˜ (0), but in this case
for R instead of N since u1 (N) > ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u1 (R) is needed to avoid deviation from N .
Note also that for very weak peer effects (ω˜ = ν˜ = 1), all infected agents would play R
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regardless, and the same would hold for healthy agents if the level of prevalence approaches
zero. The following proposition shows what are the conditions on the strength of the norm
such thatthe pooling in N equilibrium holds.
Proposition 8. a) Let ν˜
(
α, µA
)
, ω˜
(
α, µA
)
be continuous, differentiable and increasing in
α as in proposition 1, Let λN <
ui (N) + δC
(1− δ)C , so that µ
N = 1 is a Steady State Nash
Equilibrium when α = 0. Then there is a α∗ such that, for all α > α∗, µN = 1 cannot
be a Steady State Nash Equilibrium.
b) Let ν˜
(
α, µA
)
, ω˜
(
α, µA
)
and λN be defined as in a). Then there is a α∗∗ such that,
for all α > α∗∗, all healthy play N cannot be a Steady State Nash Equilibrium. If
λN < δ/ (1− δ) , a∗ = a∗∗
Proof. In the Appendix
While that pooling equilibrium cannot hold for values of α above the threshold, the
disease can still be eradicated if µN remains high enough. This means that if governments
have additional incentives to keep their citizens playing N for reasons foreign to the disease
(for example, to prevent other related diseases that agents are not aware of or to keep
pregnancies out-of-the-wedlock low), policies of permanent intervention might be needed to
keep players from deviating. On the other side, the lower the value of α, the lower the
incentive to deviate from this equilibrium, and therefore the larger the necessary tremble in
µ to break the stability.
So far, only the extreme types were necessary to describe the pooling equilibria. The
analysis of separating steady state equilibria requires a higher degree of complexity because
it depends on the distribution of preferences and the requirement or not of assortativity.
That is, the distribution would determine the level of prevalence in steady state such that
agents don't have an incentive to deviate. On the other side, in an assortative model, a
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separating equilibrium will have a fraction of agents not able to successfully match, and
therefore, a lower rate of transmission.
Definition 3. Let σ be the profile of strategies for all types in all health status, then agents
play separating strategies if
∑
h=H,I
∫
i
f(i)σi,ht (A) ∈ (0, 1) for each strategy A. Healthy
agents play separating strategies profile if
∫
i
f(i)σi,Ht (A) ∈ (0, 1).
That is, we need to find two types, iH , iI such that for i ≥ iH all healthy play R and for
i > iI all infected play R, and at least for one of them is F (i) 6= 0, 1. Then, defining It as
the vector of levels of prevalence for each type, we can define a function G(µ˜Nt , p˜i
R
t , p˜i
N
t , It)
which represents the measure of agents that are better off by playing N , when µNt agents
do so. This is an aggregation of best response functions to different states of the game, in
which the first three variables of G are involved directly in setting the relative payoffs between
strategies. The last vector of variables It is involved in setting the value of this measure since
one or more types might choose a different strategy depending on their health status, and
therefore different distribution of prevalences among types will change the distribution of the
aggregator G. Note also that given that types are monotone in preferences, there's only one
possible strategy profile for each G(µ˜Nt , p˜i
R
t , p˜i
N
t , It). This means that if G(µ˜
N
t , p˜i
R
t , p˜i
N
t , It) >
µ˜Nt , the number of agents playing N will be higher than µ˜
N
t , and if the sign is reversed, the
opposite will occur. The stage game has a Nash Equilibrium if G(µ˜N , p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t , It) = µ˜
N , and
this will be a steady state if the vector I is constant. While it's easy to see that there would
always exist a NE in the stage game using Kakutani's fixed point, it might not be true for
the steady state when the distribution of preferences is discrete, unless we allow for mixed
strategies within types.
Suppose that for some profile σ, there is a I such that the profile is a steady state Nash
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Equilibrium in separating strategies. How would this equilibrium change when ω, ν are more
variable with respect to µ. That is, let ω(µ), ν(µ) be functions as described earlier in the
paper, and let w(α, µ) = α + (1 − α)ω(µ) and v(α, µ) = α + (1 − α)ν(µ), increasing in
α, representing norms that are weaker than ω, ν, for allµ. Using both functions to ana-
lyze the effect of α, can lead to inconclusive outcomes, so we will do it separately. First,
suppose that ν(µ) = 1. Agents will decide which strategy to play based on the sign of
∆it = w(α, µ
R)ui(R)− p˜iRt C −
(
w(α, µN)ui(N)− (1− δ)p˜iNt C
)
whose derivative with respect
to α is
∂∆it
∂α
= (1− ω(µ(R)))ui(R)− (1− ω(µ(N)))ui(N)
The sign depends on the preferences (increasing in type) and the relative value of the
social components in the utility (this change affects in the same way to both healthy and
infected of the same type), but it is clear that the stronger the norm (the lower the value
of α), the stronger the incentive to play R if ω(µ(R))/ω(µ(N)) is high. The effect for low
ω(µ(R))/ω(µ(N)) will be the opposite. If ∆ changes sign for at least one type due to changes
in α, that equilibrium cannot hold at that level of I.
It is worth noting that when the ratio ω(µR)/ω(µN) is low, it will induce low level of
prevalence in the long run, and an equilibrium would be more likely to hold in steady state
when α is low, since the social effect in the demand will overcome the risk effect and deter
agents from switching back to R. The evolutionary stability is not guaranteed since trembles
in strategies would distort the relative payoffs through the relative risk. If f doesn't have
large jumps in a neighborhood of the types closer to indifference, a change in I product of
the tremble could lead to a new equilibrium with a different level of prevalence in steady
state. For example, a negative shock in µN would make R more attractive but would also
lead to a higher prevalence rate in the next period, pushing µN upwards. But this, opposing
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force could be insufficient to restore the previous steady state since there would be other
types, close in preferences, where the new dividing type in σ can settle. When the gap to
the deviation's threshold is high, relatively small shocks in µ (and their effects in I) might
not be sufficient to lead other agents to a switch.
Analyzing the case for v(α, µ) would increase in complexity since a change in α not
only brings change in the relative payoffs in the similar way as the previous case, but also,
changing the probability of finding another agent matching strategies would distort the
relative effective risk. Lower α would lower the number of matches in every period and the
same profile of strategies would lead to lower rates of contagion for each strategy.
3.2.4 Dynamics
Once that the first cohort of agents deviate from R at t0, strategy N would be more attractive
since ω(µNt0+1) > ω(0), ν(µ
N
t0+1
) > ν(0) and 1 > ω(µRt0+1), ν(µ
R
t0+1
). Then, as the norm
becomes weaker, other types might follow. On the other side, higher µN would change the
rate of contagion, and therefore the level of prevalence and the estimated risks. If the relative
risk continues to grow, this will reinforce the effect of higher µN while a decrease would play
against and might eventually reverse the dynamics.
Define G(µ˜Nt , p˜i
R
t , p˜i
N
t , It) as in the previous subsection, representing the fraction of agents
willing to play N when µ˜Nt do it. Given the monotonicity of preferences in types, this
means that this measure is formed by the lower (healthy and infected) types whose cost
of opportunity of playing N is the lowest. Before t0, G(0, p˜i
R
t , p˜i
N
t , It) = 0 as in Figure 3.a.
In this example, G is below the 45 degree line for all values, but this doesn't have to be
the case. There can be a crossing at a positive value of µN (another NE) but as long as it
pass through the origin, there will be no incentives to deviation since µ˜Nt = µ
N
t−1 = 0. As
the relative risk from playing R increases, agents would require a lower fraction of agents
playing N to find more attractive to switch, moving G to the left (the shape doesn't have
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to be preserved since, on one side, new types that would find tempting to deviate at some
µN ≤ 1, and since It is growing, the fraction of lower types willing to deviate at small values
of µN decreases). Once it reaches the vertical axis, G(0, p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t , It) > 0 as in Figures 3.b and
3.c.
Figure 3.3: Same setup for different values of It, increasing from left to right. (a)
No type has an incentive to deviate from N. (b) Two equilibria. (c) One equilibrium,
reached after two steps.
Suppose that the risk factors and type-prevalence vectors remain fixed over time. A
deviation of Gt0 agents will lead to G(Gt0 , p˜i
R, p˜iN , I) agents playing N in period t0 + 1. In
Figure 3.b, G(Gt0 , p˜i
R, p˜iN , I) = Gt0 and µ
N settles there. In figure 3.c, G(Gt0 , p˜i
R, p˜iN , I) > Gt0
and there is another group of agents deviating to N , and the game finally settles in Gt0+1.
But as the profile of strategies changes over time, so does the relative risks for each
strategy and the rate of propagation of the disease. If the new Nash Equilibrium gives
µNt and that value is insufficient to prevent It from growing, not only the relative risk will
change, but also the value of µN as some of the new infected agents will be switching to R
after infection. This will cause G to continue to move leftwards and new subsets of agents
might find themselves better of by switching to N . The opposite effect in risk might lead to
the opposite dynamics. This could be seen by looking at Figures 3.b & c, and moving from
the Nash Equilibrium of one figure to the one of the other.25 Only when I achieves a steady
state, the stage Nash Equilibrium will be stable.
25Although this case would reflect one in which the relative risk doesn't change significantly in the period
when the population adjusts strategies.
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When agents' decisions are independent of their peers, G(µN , p˜iR, p˜iN , I) is going to be
a flat line, showing the measure of those agents for which ui(R) − (1 − δ)piRt C < ui(N) −
(1 − δ)piNt C. Define this function G(p˜iR, p˜iN , I).26 This changes when functions ν(µ), ω(µ)
are active, making that expression decreasing in µN , and such that ui(R)−ν(0)ω(0)ui(N) >
ui(R)−ui(N) > ν(0)ω(0)ui(R)−ui(N), ∀i, which means that we preserve the same expected
net cost of infection, G(0, p˜iR, p˜iN , I) < G(p˜iR, p˜iN , I) < G(1, p˜iR, p˜iN , I). This inequality should
always hold when agents perfectly mix (ν = 1) for any function ω, or when ui(A) − (1 −
δ)piAC > 0 for A ∈ {R,N}.
The range of µN at which G(µN , p˜iR, p˜iN , I) < G(p˜iR, p˜iN , I) will depend both on the
distribution of preferences f and, especially, on the concavity of the social components of
the utility. For example, if f is skewed to more lower types, G will grow fast for lower values
of µN , leaving G over that line for a considerable range of µ. A similar distribution for
G would have a quick sequence of jumps of the function as long as It continues to grow,
but it won't have any mechanism to feed this . On the other side, when ω(0) is low but
it grows significantly for low values of µ, the ratio ω(µ
N )ui(N)
ω(µR)ui(R)
grows rapidly after the lowest
types deviate, inducing a higher rate of deviation for low values of µN . This means that a
considerable portion of G will be over the 45 degree line as in the previous case, but this
effect is purely from ω and not from the distribution f , therefore having no effect on G¯. This
opens the possibility of convergence at a much higher µN than the benchmark. However,
if the function grows too fast for low values of µN , this also means that ω(µR) would only
drop when µR is very low, limiting the highest feasible steady state for µN . On the other
side, even though the initial stages of the cascade are slower when ω is convex, the ratio
ω(µN)/ω(µR) grows at a faster pace for higher values of µN . Convex ω can lead to higher
prevalence on the peak of the disease, but lower level of disease in the steady state.
This property of G, of being increasing and opening the possibility of multiple equilibria
26This would also be a way to observe uniqueness in equilibrium in this case.
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can work in favor of policies that look to contain or eradicate the disease. When the social
functions are inactive, any policy seeking higher µN will lower the level of prevalence, but
as soon as this policy is discontinued, this lower value of I will induce to lower µN , and
the dynamics would lead back to the unique steady state. In the following section we will
see that this multiple equilibria property can be used by the policymaker to induce an
equilibrium that reduce the level of prevalence in steady state, and whose stability is not
dependent on the continuation of the policy in the long run.
3.3 Policy Implications
There are several approaches that policy makers could use to reduce the effect of the an
epidemic outbreak and this will depend on the nature of the disease and means available.
In our setup, for example, we assumed that both strategies are available and agents choose
the one that will given them higher expected utility.27 In this section three different policies
will be explored: reducing the cost of opportunity of N (through a subsidy ε such that
ui(N)+ε
ui(R)−ε ), increasing the information aboutthe true risk of each strategy, and increasing the
information about other agents' willingness to deviate. These policies could be explored in
a deeper analysis and their simplified version serves as an example of its effectiveness in
reducing the extent of the contagion. Moreover, the decision over their application should
include both the level of prevalence and the effects on welfare, since there is a trade off
between lower utility in the present period (by playing costly N) and increasing the external
cost of higher level of prevalence in the future. Not only a policy pushing an early deviation
can be costly in resources needed, but also induce Pareto dominated outcomes.28
27As it is the case with condoms, that are not always available in certain regions
28See Toxværd (2015)
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3.3.1 Reducing the cost of opportunity of N
Suppose the government can (costly) reduce the cost of opportunity of playing N with a sub-
sidy εt. That is, ∆
i
t = ν˜
R
t ω˜
R
t (u
i (R)− ε)− ν˜Nt ω˜Nt (ui (N) + εt) + (1− δ)
(
ν˜Nt λ
N − ν˜Rt λR
)
ItC.
Then, given an endowment of resources, the government set a sequence of εt such that they
can maximize its objective function. This function can be either maximizing the aggregate
utility or just minimizing the total number of infected.29 The details of this optimization
problem will be left for the Online Appendix. The focus of this subsection is to compare
the effects of different policies to different strengths of the social norms. If individuals only
base their decisions on the risk of contagion, the only variable to take into account in their
decision making is the level of prevalence:
ui (R)− ui (N)− 2εt
(1− δ) (λN − λR)C
 > It, type i plays N< It, type i plays R
This subsidy will induce negative values for ∆ for lower values of I, containing the total
number of infected. In Figure 4 we observe the effect of ε on a setup where there are two
types of agents. A temporary policy can only retard the explosion, but the rate of growth
will return to the level as if the policy never took place.
In this example with a binary distribution, when there's no policy, we have a continuous
cycle in which low types switch to N , lowering N to the point they are better off switching
back to R. The policy brings an earlier deviation, when the prevalence is half the value of the
no policy case. There is no cycle when the policy is active, but as soon as it is discontinued,
29Since there is a loss in utility from protection, minimizing the extent of the disease might not be efficient.
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Figure 3.4: f={0.6,0.4}, ui(R) = 1 − ui(N), u0(R) = 0.6, u1(R) = 0.75, λR = 1/17,
λN = 1/36, δ = 1/30. The blue lines corresponds to the evolution of the game without
any policy, the green ones to a policy of ε = 1/15 for 100 periods. The red ones to the
same policy but applied permanent
the population pools back in R. A permanent small subsidy is more effective than a large
one for a short period of time.
A policy designed for this type of dynamics might be ineffective once we introduce norms
in the model. Stronger norms imply higher cost of initial deviation. This will have not only
an effect on the utility but on the subsidy as well since ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0) (ui (N) + εt) (but still, the
effect will be full decreasing the utility of playing R). Therefore, we will observe that not
only a policy of constant small subsidies might have lower impact when the norms are strong
than when they are weak, but also we might see no effect at all if λR is not high enough to
reach I¯. Policies of short term big shocks can be more effective to control the disease since
the peer pressure effect would prevent agents from switching back to R.
We will study the effects in each factor ν˜, ω˜ separately, assuming the other one is equal
to 1, since ν has also direct effect on the rate of contagion.
The effect of subsidy under perfect mixing ω˜
Let ν(µ) = 1. It's easy to see that I¯ decreases with ε.30.
30This is a strong assumption. The subsidy is affected by the social standing of that strategy. If this
transfer is independent of the norm (ω(µN )u(N) + ε), the effect on the threshold would be double or almost
double than in the examples below. By running the same simulation as in Figure 6 both models will differ
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I¯ =
u0 (R)− ω˜ (0)u0 (N)− (1 + ω(0))εt
(1− δ) (λR − λN)C
In Figure 5, we compare the dynamics with and without a policy of permanent subsidy
with no policy for different linear combinations of ω(µRt ) (using ω
A
t = µ
A
t + β(1 − µAt )).
The difference between both cases is that in this case we chose a higher λR and the sole
observable consequence of the policy in this case is a slight earlier departure from the norm.
The only exception is β = 2/3 for which the policy brings an completely different outcome.
Figure 3.5: Same setup as Figure 4, but λ = 1/14. It compares the effect of the
permanent subsidy of ε = 1/15 for different strengths of the linear peer pressure
A more interesting example would be when λR has a relatively low, such that at some
point the low type agents switch to N under the no norm scenario, but they won't for low
values of β, as we see in the leftmost column of Figure 6. In this case, it is possible that the
same policy used before, that is effective under the no norm scenario, may have no impact
for stronger peer effects scenarios. That is, if the steady state level of prevalence when all
agents pool on R is I
(
λR
)
= 1− δ
(1− δ)λR then, the case described above is such that:
more, the lower ω(0)
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u0(R)− u0(N)− 2εt
(1− δ)(λR − λN)C < 1−
δ
(1− δ)λR <
u0(R)− ω˜(β, 0)u0(N)− (1 + ω˜(β, 0))εt
(1− δ)(λR − λN)C
We can see in the figure that a permanent small subsidy has an impact for cases where
ω˜ (β, 0) is close enough to 1, but it is useless for lower values.
Figure 3.6: Same setup as figure 4 (back to λ = 1/17). Left: No policy. Middle:
ε = 1/15 applied permanently. Right: ε = 1/5 applied between periods (125,224).
But this necessarily doesn't mean that it would be needed a bigger overall budget but, as
we've seen above, a larger concentration of effort in a shorter period of time such that not only
the lower types gain from deviating, but also enough agents playing the new strategy that no
subsidy would be needed to either sustain that profile of strategies in equilibrium, or generate
the snowball effect endogenously.31 This is never possible higher β since ω˜ (2/3, 0)u1 (R) >
31As a matter of fact, in that example, we can achieve exactly the same outcome for β = 1/3 if we apply
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u1 (N), making high types switch back to R, when this strategy's cost is low, starting the
process again. Note also that this shock is not even enough to push the scenario of the top
row out of the All R equilibrium.
This policy of subsidy doesn't have to be applied to the whole population. When It is
high enough, the threshold µN such that G(µN , p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t , It) > 0 would be a relatively low
value. A government that lack the resources to apply the policy to the entire population
might try to subsidize a fraction of agents such that the µN threshold is reached. However,
the same effect applies: for this policy to be effective, its shock in relative payoffs must be
large when the peer pressure to play with the norm is strong.
Figure 7 shows the effect of different timing of this temporary policy. Too early and
ui(R) − εt − ω˜(0) (ui(N) + εt) + (1− δ)
(
λN − λR) ItC > 0 and the policy might not have
any effect. A policy applied too late, will have an impact in the total number of infected
but its reduction would be suboptimal.
Figure 3.7: Effect of timing on the performance of a temporary policy
This problem of timing would be more complex than in Figure 7 if there was a larger
number of types, and long lasting effects would require either multiple shocks or sustaining
one over time to avoid intermediate equilibria. Moreover, if the policymaker doesn't have
the subsidy for two periods only. I decided to use 100 to show a meaningful effect on the weaker norm cases.
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accurate information regarding preferences, this window of policies would need to be wider,
the smoother the density function is.
Subsidy under assortative matching
Suppose that ωA = 1 and the matching technology is such that ν (µ) ≥ µ, and players need
to match strategies with a random agent to have positive payoffs. The effect of a subsidy
would be similar than in the previous case, but the dynamics can be severely affected by
assortativity and the matching technology given that they impacts the rate of contagion.
That is, given that the rate of contagion is now given by ν
(
µAt
)
λA, in each period, there will
be µRt
(
1− ν (µRt ))+µNt (1− ν (µNt )) players unmatched, which will give a steeper decrease
in growth of It. This is important because a policy aimed to accelerate an early departure
from µR = 1, may find that the rate of prevalence is dropping faster than the rate at which
agents switch to N , leading to a cycle before the extension of the epidemic could be reduced
significantly. Then, while it may look as desirable to have a lower rate of contagion, a cyclical
evolution can lead to a higher number of infected individuals in the long run.
In the following proposition we compare the how the model changes when agents need
to match strategies in order to have positive utility. For this, we will compare the model of
the previous subsection (where ν (µ) = 1) to this new setup, but using that both functions
are equal
Proposition 9. Suppose there are two different setups such that their willingness to deviate
are given by ∆ωt (Σ˜t) = ω˜
R
t u(R) − (1 − δ)p˜iRt C −
(
ω˜Nt u(N)− (1− δ)p˜iNt C
)
and ∆νt (Σ˜t) =
ν˜Rt
(
µ˜Rt u(R)− (1− δ)p˜iRt C
) − ν˜Nt (u(N)− (1− δ)p˜iNt C), where the social components of the
utility are such that ω(µ) = ν(µ) = x(µ) for all µ ∈ [0, 1], then,
a) ∆νt (Σ˜t) ≤ ∆ωt (Σ˜t) for µR = 1
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b) There is a value for µR = µˆ such that ∆νt (Σ˜t) ≥ ∆ωt (Σ˜t) for all µR ≤ µˆ
c) Any steady state of I has Iω ≥ Iν for a fixed µR.
Proof. a) I˜Nt = I˜
R
t = It−1 since agents can't access to detailed informa-
tion about the strategies played by health status. ∆ω
(
µRt
) − ∆νt (µRt ) =
−CIt
((
1− x (µRt ))λR − (1− x (1− µRt ))λN) .When µRt = 1, x (1) = 1, and x (0) ≥ 0
so ∆ω (1)−∆ν (1) = CIt
(
1− x (1− µRt ))λN ≥ 0, which means that the level of preva-
lence such that the first cohort of agents will depart from R is lower for the imperfect
matching technology.
b) Using the same expression as in a), ∆ω
(
µRt
) − ∆νt (µRt ) =
−CIt
((
1− x (µRt ))λR − (1− x (1− µRt ))λN), which means that any agent find
deviation more profitable under ν if
((
1− x (µRt ))λR − (1− x (1− µRt ))λN) . This
expression is negative for µRt = 1 but grows as µ
R
t becomes lower. Then µˆ is the lowest
µR such that .
1− x (µˆ)
1− x (1− µˆ) =
λN
λR
c) This is straightforward as a consequence of the lower rate of transmission ν
(
µA
)
λA ∈[
0, λA
]
Note that since x (µ) ≥ µ, when the protection is very effective (λN −→ 0) the incentive
to play R will be higher under ν for almost all values of µ. Combined with the lower rate
of transmission under this matching technology, the chances of failure for a given policy are
higher and if the goal is to achieve a separating equilibrium, a higher µN would be needed
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to compensate for the lower risk in steady state in order to avoid a cycle.32 This means
that any policy of subsidies should either try to speed the convergence to µN = 1 or to
compensate by increasing εt over time to compensate for the loss of risk.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous signal on prevalence
When matching strategies is not required, information regarding the way the infected indi-
viduals play is irrelevant for the decision making, as the risk only depend on the aggregate
prevalence level. But when players need to find a match, the level of prevalence for each
strategy becomes important to assess the true risk. An example of this could be making
public a survey specifying the rate of infected of STD for different rates of use of condoms.
While a realistic survey would take into account that people might use protection with dif-
ferent degrees of frequency and periods of time, in this model we will simplify this using just
the information of last periods strategy of choice, disregarding if the match was successful
or not.
Modeling this requires additional assumptions about how agents would process the infor-
mation. We will assume that they still observe an imperfect signal I˜At (γ) = γI
A
t−1+(1−γ)It−1,
such that I˜At (1) = I
A
t−1. For intermediate values of γ, agents may have an idea which strategy
is more popular among infected individuals, but cannot assess exact level of prevalence. A
policy in this regard would make IRt−1, I
N
t−1 public for a certain interval of time. The remain-
ing question is how to assume I˜At when µ
A
t = 0. If ν(0) = 0, this wouldn't matter as the
expected utility of playing A would be zero regardless of I˜A, but as the matching mechanism
gets better, and ν(0) > 0, one option could be to assume that the agent expects that the
potential partner could be any agent and therefore I˜At = It when µ
A = 0. Another is to
32Note that we haven't included the subsidies so far in this subsection. This is because the effect on the
relative utility should be the same under these setups, but it's the effect of risk in the decision that have a
higher impact here.
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assume that when all agents pool in one strategy, risk is the only factor that leads an agent
to deviation and therefore, only healthy individuals would be doing it IAt = 0 when µ
A
t = 0,
so I˜At (γ) = (1−γ)It−1.33 The second one seems more appropriate and modifies the threshold
prevalence such that an early departure will occur.
Proposition 10. Let ∆it(µ
R
t−1, I
R
t , I
N
t , γ) = ν
R
t ω
R
t u
i(R) − νRt λRIRt (γ)C − (νNt ωNt ui(N) −
νNt λ
NINt (γ)C) be positive if agent i plays R and negative if she plays N .
a)
∂∆it(µ
R
t−1,I
R
t ,I
N
t ,γ)
∂γ
< 0 only if IRt > It > I
N
t
b) Let I¯(γ) be the highest level of prevalence such that µR = 1 is a NE, then ∂/barI(γ)
∂γ
< 0
Proof. a) Given ∆it(µ
R
t−1, I
R
t , I
N
t , γ) and using I
A
t (γ) = γI
A
t + (1 − γ)It, ∂∆
i
t(µ
R
t−1,I
R
t ,I
N
t ,γ)
∂γ
=
−νRt λR(IRt − It)C+νNt λN(INt − It)C. Note that each of the components in parenthesis
would have opposite sign since It is a weighted average between I
R
t and I
N
t (unless
both variables are equal). The sign for the expression will depend on the sign of the
parenthesis, which means that when (INt − It) < 0 the partial derivative is negative
b) Suppose that γ and λR, λN are such that there is an overall level of prevalence I¯ (γ) such
that ∆0t
(
1, I¯t, 0, γ
)
= 0, taking derivatives as in the proof for a), and using the fact
that IRt = It and I
N
t = 0,
ui(R) − λRI¯t(γ)C − (ν(0)ω(0)ui(N) − ν(0)λN(1 − γ)I¯t(γ)C) = 0 I¯t(γ) =
ui(R)− ν(0)ω(0)ui(N)
(λR − ν(0)λN(1− α))C
dI¯t(γ)
dγ
= − u
i(R)− ν(0)ω(0)ui(N)
(λR − ν(0)λN(1− γ))2C < 0
33This is the ex-ante belief about the levels of prevalence. The rate at which the disease is spread would
eventually depend on the strategies chosen by the agents and will be given by the true IAt
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This lemma shows that better information regarding the actions of infected individuals
lead to an earlier deviation from the norm in R and would increase the incentives to play
N as long as its prevalence rate is lower.34 It is worth to remark that one key difference
between this policy and the one of subsidy is that the latter involves a transfer that change
the relative payoff of the strategies to accommodate to a more desirable outcome. This
policy, on the contrary, reduces the bias between expected and realized risk arisen from the
lack incomplete information. That is, by knowing values closer to the true IRt , I
N
t , agents
are less prone to take sub-optimal decisions regarding risk (they are still not able to predict
them perfectly as they can't anticipate changes in strategy by other agents), and the effect
should be welfare enhancing as it helps to reduce the negative external effects from future
infections. Note that when the effect of risk is important in the decision making, this policy's
effect can grow in strength over time if it leads to more healthy agents switching to N and
therefore widening the difference between λRIRt and λ
NINt and thus even making N even
more appealing for healthy agents.
3.3.3 Weakening the norm
In this model, agents' information is incomplete in a way that they are unable to act strate-
gically predicting other agents' changes in strategies. Thus, when It reaches I¯, the new
equilibrium is achieved through a series of best responses to last period's actions and current
risk values. Having they complete information, each period's profile would be coordinated
34Although it seems logic to assume that the proportion of infected agents would be higher among those
playing R, there's the possibility of having the opposite situation. For example, when ui(R)/ui(N) is very
large, f(1) is relatively low and N is not a very effective protection (such that the rate of prevalence cannot
go below a certain point if all agents play N), then all agents except the healthy of type 1 playing N could
be an equilibrium.
We can also get to a similar outcome if νRt λ
R is consistently lower than νNt λ
N and the proportions of
infected is not too dissimilar, reducing the level of prevalence on R faster than on N,even without getting to
a paradoxical profile of strategies.
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in the sense that agents would be able to anticipate other agents' deviation and the re-
sponse of their peers. If agents could see a reliable exogenous signal of how other agents
are willing to play, their payoff's equations would change. That is, if, for example, an agent
knew that in that period a fraction θt would switch strategies from R to N , she will use(
µ˜Rt , µ˜
N
t
)
=
(
µRt−1 − θt, µNt−1 + θt
)
to calculate ν˜At , ω˜
A
t . Moreover, as we've seen in section 2,
the game can have multiple equilibria, which means that a fine tuned value for θt can lead to
a new coordination in which they won't have incentive to deviate, that couldn't be reached
unless the current equilibrium ceases to be such.
Suppose that the policy maker can set the public signal
(
µ˜Rt , µ˜
N
t
)
that agents will observe
at t, but this signal has to match
(
µRt , µ
N
t
)
ex post. Obtaining this information wouldn't be
that difficult if agents could be surveyed asking them what is the minimum µN such that
they would play N and, after obtaining a distribution of their answers, the set of possible
equilibria can be obtained. Thus, the policymaker would obtain this minimum value of µN
(denoted µ¯N
(
p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t
)
) for each individual surveyed35 and from this a distribution g for each
value, such that the aggregate forms the function G
(
µ¯N , p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t , I
)
used in the previous
section.36 We will assume that G
(
µ¯N , p˜iR, p˜iN , I
)
is increasing in µ˜N , which means that a
bigger fraction of agents playing N would always make it more appealing to a larger number,
ceteris paribus the risk. This assumption is not unnecessary since it's possible to have the
paradox in which R is appealing only because its total risk (ν
(
µ˜R
)
p˜iRt ) is much lower than
for N .
Then, government's policy would be one of equilibrium selection, depending on its ul-
timate objective. If this is to minimize the number of infected individuals, then it will
always pick the equilibrium with highest µN as early as possible. But if the government's
35Each type in preferences and health would share the same value.
36It is easy to see that given ∆i
(
µR, p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t
)
decrease with the risk of R and increase with the risk of N,
∂G
(
µN , p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t , I
)
∂p˜iRt
≥ 0 and ∂G
(
µN , p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t , I
)
∂p˜iNt
≤ 0. Also note that if (p˜iR, p˜iN) change to (p˜iR′, p˜iN ′), as long
as ν
(
µR
) (
p˜iR − p˜iR′) is greater than the one of ν (µN) (p˜iN − p˜iN ′), G (µ¯N , p˜iR, p˜iN , I) > G (µ¯N , p˜iR′, p˜iN ′, I)
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problem is to maximize the present value of the aggregate utility, on one side, a higher µN
would increase welfare by reducing future level of prevalence and the negative externality
that accompanies it, but at the cost of a large group of agents choosing a strategy that
gives them lower payoff. Then, an optimal policy would consist on choosing a sequence of
Nash Equilibria among all possible sub-game perfect outcomes, such that the present value
of total welfare is maximized, where each period's game will be conditioned by preferences
and
(
p˜iRt , p˜i
N
t
)
, which is the product of the initial values at t = 0 and the history of play in
the game. Therefore, the policymaker will try to keep µN relatively low, but high enough
to keep the level of prevalence to a reasonable level such that the negative externality of
contagion is low.
On a more realistic level, governments might be unable to perform this policy repeatedly
and it would be improbable that people could believe that a large fraction of their peers are
willing to deviate in that period if R has been the norm. Suppose that given a level of preva-
lence I∗ and all agents playing R, government officials want to implement a policy to increase
the fraction of agents playing N . Let µ∗ be the fixed point of G
(
µ, piR (I∗) , piN (I∗) , I∗
)
.
This means that there is a type i∗ such that F (i∗) = µ∗, and for all i ≥ i∗
ν (1− µ∗)ω (1− µ∗)ui (R)−ν (1− µ∗) p˜iRt (I∗)C ≤ ν (µ∗)ω (µ∗)ui (N)−ν (µ∗) p˜iNt (I∗)C. If,
alternatively, the government was looking to achieve the same change with a one period shock
through subsidy it would be ui
∗
(R)− ν (0)ω (0)ui∗ (N)− (p˜iRt (I∗)− ν (0) p˜iNt (I∗))C ≤ ε.37
Which policy would be less costly will depend on the cost of making the information pub-
lic in the first one, against the cost of the subsidy in the second (µ∗ε). Then, while the
first amount is fixed, the second changes with the number of agents deviating and with the
amount needed for type i∗ to switch strategies.
37This value is to achieve µN = µ∗ in one period, after which no incentive is needed for the system to stay
in equilibrium, as long as the level of prevalence didn't move significantly from t to t + 1. A lower value
can set a chain of best responses that would eventually lead to a similar outcome, but this would depend
on the evolutionary stability of that equilibrium. Also, the subsidy here accounts for the total effect of it
(ε =
(
ν
(
µR
)
ω
(
µR
)
+ ν
(
µN
)
ω
(
µN
))
ε′), instead of just the change in the cost of opportunity.
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While the switching equilibrium policy can be cost effective for a sudden change in one
period, subsidies can get the same outcome over time with a lower investment if the interval
in µ for which µN is an attractor. Moreover, such equilibrium might not exist, having to
opt between one that is too costly in terms of utility (µN too high) or ineffective to reduce
the level of the disease (µN too low). Additionally, the subsidy has the possibility to reach
outcomes that are not Nash Equilibria of the game.
A different way to tackle the weakening of the norm is from a different perspective.
When traditions are strong and deviation is too costly, the effect of a signal can have an
effect on the norm beyond the change in payoffs. Let this be a society where the peer
pressure is extreme (ω˜ (0) = 0), information regarding a positive fraction considering to
deviate from R might have a structural effect in the model. That is, an agent's realization
that, for example, 50% of the agents is considering to switch to N , would mean that even
if only a fraction of them does it, the social punishment from deviating would not be such
that ω (0) = 0. Then, using the same functional forms as in Proposition 3, a signal µ¯N
can be represented, alternatively, as if the social component in the utility function becomes
ω (α, µ) , such that ω (α, 0) = ω
(
µ¯N
)
, effectively leading to a weaker peer effect on the util-
ity function. This α can have a permanent level, or it can be a sequence of αt converging to 0.
3.4 Conclusion
In this paper I analyzed the effects of social norms and matching mechanisms on the predic-
tion of the outcome of an epidemic. That is, I constructed a dynamic population game in
which a disease can be transmitted between agents depending on their decisions regarding
prevention. In standard models, each agent is affected by the actions of others only through
the level of prevalence, which is a consequence of the history of aggregate profiles of actions.
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In this work, the expected benefits from each strategy depends on the its popularity among
peers. These effects can come either from lower utility or from lower probability of matching
strategies when playing differently than the majority. These factors are important because
when the social costs of deviating from a well established norm or tradition are high enough,
the disease will eventually peak at a much higher level than predicted by models that don't
account for this, or we can even observe that the deviation would never occur. On the other
side, these direct effects of peer pressure in the utility function allows for the existence of
multiple equilibria, even for low values of prevalence. This means that while the benchmark
model would have a level of prevalence that would either converge or oscillate in a neighbor-
hood of its peak, when other agents' actions have direct effect on the utility, the population
might settle in a profile of strategies such that the level of prevalence decrease over time but
no type is willing to deviate.
This is important when policymakers devise a strategy to contain the disease. The
nature of the policy needed will depend on the strength of peer pressure. Weaker norms
would require permanent small interventions while strong norms would need large shocks for
a short period of time. Moreover, the path of play can be altered by changing information
observed by the agents, without artificially changing the relative benefits of each strategy.
Information regarding potential intentions to deviate from the norm by a subset of their
peers would weaken the expected social punishment from doing it, leading to adoption of
prevention at lower levels of prevalence. Also, this model also shows why infected agents
could be willing to bear the cost of protection even when no assumptions about altruism were
made. This is super-duper awesome for those diseases that need a matching of strategies
(such as sexually transmitted diseases) and other types whose rate of transmission depend
at least partially on these infected agents' behavior. In this regard, policies regarding the
availability of information regarding the true risk of contagion could help to induce agents to
switch away from riskier strategies and also increase the accuracy of their expected outcome.
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Additional features can be used to make a more comprehensive model if the aim is to do
a quantitative analysis. This direct effect of other agents' strategies in the utility function
is not the only driver but one of many. The aim of this paper is to compare its effect on the
course of an epidemic with the case when norms are overlooked. In this work, agents mix
perfectly but societies are structured with a certain degree of clustering in age, class, religion
and other features that would make the spread of this disease more similar to a diffusion on a
network. Nevertheless, since agents cannot observe the health status of their neighbors, the
decision making process would be set in the same way. Moreover, such a model can include
other dimensions in the decision making such as heterogeneity in the frequency of exposure
(including refraining from participating), and access to better information regarding the risks
involved. A real world analysis should include external effects outside of the disease in study
and a delayed knowledge of the consequences of the agents' decisions.
Although reducing the level of prevalence of one disease can be beneficial for the
government, keeping a high level of protection in the population might be beneficial from
the welfare perspective if agents overlook other risks involved. For example, while agents
might base their decisions on a cost-benefit analysis of contracting AIDS, other STDs can
have a higher prevalence (but maybe lighter consequences) and agents might not be aware
of. Moreover, strategies other than the use of condom, like using the drug TRUVADA
would be ineffective to prevent unexpected pregnancies, that dampen the social mobility of
lower classes. Finally, we used a binary decision on interactions that last for one period. In
reality, agents' interaction can last an undetermined number of periods and this duration
can be part of their strategy.
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3.5 Appendix
Proof. (Lemma 1):
a) The dynamics when agents are pooling in R is simple since the infected population is
being fed from one strategy:
It+1 = (1− δ) It + (1− δ)µRt piRt (1− It)
It+1 = (1− δ) It + (1− δ)λRIt (1− It)
In steady state
I = 1− δ
(1− δ)λR = 0 only when λ
R <
δ
1− δ since I cannot take negative values.
b) and c) Note that the infected will always play R under µRt , as u
i (R) >
ν˜Nt ω˜
N
t u
i (N). Since µRt−1 = 1, V
i,H
t
(
R, Σ˜t
)
= ui (R) − (1− δ) p˜iRt C.and V i,Ht
(
N, Σ˜t
)
=
ν˜Nt
(
ω˜Nt u
i (N)− (1− δ) p˜iNt C
)
.Given that the process has no memory if health status doesn't
change, and agents don't make assumptions about change of variables in the future, so an
agent will switch strategies if
ui (R)− (1− δ) p˜iRt C < ν˜Nt
(
ω˜Nt u
i (N)− (1− δ) p˜iNt C
)
(
ui (R)− ν˜Nt ω˜Nt ui (N)
)
+ (1− δ) ν˜Nt p˜iNt C < (1− δ) p˜iRt C
Let I
(
λR
)
be the steady state value for I when everybody plays R.
(
ui (R)− ν˜Nt ω˜Nt ui (N)
)
+ (1− δ) ν˜Nt λNI
(
λR
)
C < (1− δ)λRI (λR)C
(
ui (R)− ν˜Nt ω˜Nt ui (N)
)
(1− δ)C <
(
λR − ν˜Nt λN
)
I
(
λR
)
111
Since this expression is the smallest for type 0, the threshold is
u0 (R)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u0 (N)
(1− δ)CI (λR) + ν˜ (0)λ
N < λR
Else, there won't be a deviation if λR is smaller than that threshold.
Proof. (Proposition 1) From the previous Lemma, I¯ =
ui (R)− ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)ui (N)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜ (0)λN)C
a)
∂I¯ν (α)
∂α
=
∂
(
ui (R)− ν˜ (α, 0) ω˜ (0)ui (N)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜ (α, 0)λN)C
)
∂α
∂I¯ν (α)
∂α
=
(
λNui (R)− λRω˜ (0)ui (N)
((1− δ) (λR − ν˜ (α, 0)λN)C)2
)
(1− δ)C∂ν˜ (α, 0)
∂α
< 0
Now, since
I¯ν (0)− I¯ν (1) = λ
Nui (R)− λRω˜ (0)ui (N)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜ (0)λN)λRC
which is positive by assumption, it is easy to see that I¯ν (1) < I¯ν (α) < I¯ν (0)
b)
∂I¯ω (α)
∂α
=
−ν˜Nt ui (N)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜Nt λN)C
∂ω˜ (α)
∂α
< 0
Since I¯ω (0)− I¯ω (1) = ν˜ (0) ω˜ (0)u
i (N)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜ (0)λN)C > 0, then I¯
ω (1) < I¯ω (α) < I¯ω (0)
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c) This is easy to see since
∂2I¯
∂ν˜ (0) ∂ω˜ (0)
=
∂2I¯
∂ω˜ (0) ∂ν˜ (0)
=
−λRui (N)
(1− δ) (λR − ν˜ (0)λN)2C < 0
Proof. (Proposition 3)
a) In steady state, the prevalence level is I
(
λN
)
= 1− 1
(1− δ)λN and it's independent
of the norms if all agents play N . A healthy agent deviates if
∆i,H
(
α, Σ˜t
)
= V i,Ht
(
R, Σ˜t
)
− V i,Ht
(
N, Σ˜t
)
= ν˜ (α, 0)
(
ω˜ (α, 0)ui (R)− (1− δ)λRI (λN)C)− (ui (N)− (1− δ)λNI (λN)C)
Which gives
∂∆i,H
(
α, Σ˜t
)
∂α
=
(
ω˜ (α, 0)ui (R)− (1− δ)λRI (λN)C) ∂ν˜ (α, 0)
∂α
+
ui (R)
∂ω˜ (α, 0)
∂α
,
which is positive as long as V i,ht
(
R, Σ˜t
)
> 0. The sign of this expression will depend
on the functional forms of ω, ν and the resulting incidence of the disease. That is, if
u1 (R) − (1− δ)λRI (λN)C < 0, then no healthy type would deviate to R under such a
level of prevalence in steady state. If the sign of the inequality is the opposite, then if(
u1 (R)− (1− δ)λRI (λN)C)− (u1 (N)− (1− δ)λNI (λN)C) > 0, given that ν˜ (α, 0) and
ω˜ (α, 0) are continuous and increasing in α, there's a α∗H such that for all α greater than
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that threshold, at least one type of healthy agents will deviate.
Infected agents would deviate if ∆i,H
(
Σ˜t
)
= ν˜ (α, 0) ω˜ (α, 0)ui (R) − ui (N) > 0. Given
that ν˜ (α, 0) ω˜ (α, 0) is continuous and increasing in α, and that ν˜ (0, 0) ω˜ (0, 0)u1 (R) −
u1 (N) < 0 and u1 (R)− u1 (N) > 0, then there is a α∗I such that for all α > α∗I one of the
infected agents' types will deviate to R. Then, α∗ = min
(
α∗H , α∗I
)
.
b) If ∆1,H
(
1, Σ˜t
)
=
(
u1 (R)− (1− δ)λRI (λN)C)−(u1 (N)− (1− δ)λNI (λN)C) > 0,
α∗∗ = α∗H and we are done. Suppose the inequality has the opposite sign. From a), we
know that for α > α∗I , at least those infected agents of type 1 will deviate. Suppose that for
some value α1, a measure Fα
1
of infected agents play R while the rest of the infected and
all the healthy play N. Then, given that the proportion of infected over healthy is lower,
I
(
λN , Fα
1
)
< I
(
λN
)
. If ∆1,H
(
1, Σ˜1t
)
> 0, we are done, else we look for a higher α, α2.
We will solve this formally.
From the previous paragraph it is clear that as we increase the value of α over α∗I ,
the measure of infected switching will grow and the prevalence level will decrease. Then,
let I (α) be a decreasing function of α such that I (0) = I
(
λN
)
and I (1) = 0. The last
equality is true since ν˜ (1, 0) ω˜ (1, 0) = 1 and ui (R) − ui (N) > 0 for all i. Then, there's an
α = α0 > α∗I such that the measure of infected types is such that I
(
λN , Fα
0
)
= 0. But if
the level of prevalence is 0, ∆1,H
(
α0, Σ˜t
)
= ∆1,I
(
α0, Σ˜t
)
> 0. Then, α∗∗ = inf α such that
∆1,H
(
α, Σ˜t
)
≥ 0.
If λN < δ/ (1− δ) then I (λN) = 0 and it is straightforward to see that α∗ = α∗∗
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